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ARTICLES
PRESENT AT THE CREATION? A CRITICAL GUIDE TO
WEEKS v. UNITED STATES AND ITS PROGENY

GERARD V. BRADLEY*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The irony of it all is that the exclusionary rule's' most redoubtable
and acerbic critic should now, posthumously, lead its rescue brigade.
Northwestern Law School Dean and evidence don, John Wigmore,
greeted the now hallowed decision in Weeks v. United States2 by savaging it with Agnewesque vituperation.3 He compared the "high-mettled"
Court" to a "sensitive steed" sometimes frightened by a familiar object-here, the "sound and harmless doctrine" that illegally procured
evidence was nonetheless admissible.7 "After being carefully led past
the darksome object a few times, the steed finally became callous"
enough to approve the doctrine in the 1904 Adams v. New York 9 case.
"But now in Weeks . . . horror has seized it again; it has thrown its
rider over the fence; and another period of careful training seems to be
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. Fred
Heinrich, University of Illinois College of Law Class of 1985, provided truly exceptional research assistance as well as wise counsel during this Article's preparation. I
thank him. Lynne Dombrowski aided final preparation of the manuscript and, along
with Liz Doyle, Ruth Snyder, and Susan Atwood, is responsible for the research that
went into footnotes 64 and 65 and which will bear further fruit as an article on the
original understanding of the fourth amendment.
1. Whenever the terms "exclusion," "exclusionary rule," and "suppression" are
used in this Article, they are intended as synonymous references to fourth amendment
doctrine. When reference is made to the fifth amendment's prohibition on trial use of a
certain class of evidence, it is specially denoted.
2. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3. Wigmore, Evidence-Fourth Amendment-Documents Illegally Seized, 9
ILL. L. REV. 43 (1915).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
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necessary." 10 Despite his protestations and conditioning efforts, Wigmore later reported bitterly that Weeks' "heretical influence" had
evoked a "contagion" of similar "sentimentality" among state courts, 1
and he promptly subjected those disciples to epithets evidently drawn
from a turn of the century "Dirty Harry" script. He branded the nostrum that "[lt is better that the guilty escape punishment in some instances than that -[the] securities of liberty be violated"'" as mere emotion "dragged in to protect petty lawbreakers"' 3 and as nothing other
than "coddling the criminal classes."' 4 Detestably, it was fast becoming
the "usual cant." These "throttling interpretations on the natural and
legitimate processes of law enforcement"' 5 that needlessly endangered
society, were rooted in a misguided judicial "sentimentality," and
would have astonished our constitutional forefathers to boot." Finally,
are police officers
an exasperated Wigmore wondered aloud: "[H]ow
17
going to arrest dynamiters in emergencies? '
Wigmore apparently even consulted the venerable Gibbon for his
satirical account of the Weeks fallacy:
"Titus, you have been found guilty of conducting a lottery;
Flavius, you have confessedly violated the constitution. Titus ought
to suffer imprisonment for crime, and Flavius for contempt. But no!
We shall let you both go free. We shall not punish Flavius directly,
but shall do so by reversing Titus' conviction. This is our way of
teaching people like Flavius to behave, and of teaching people like
Titus to behave, and incidentally of securing respect for the Constitution. Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike at the
man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something
else."' 8
Wigmore would correct the error "by sending for the high-handed marshal . . .who . . . searched without a warrant, imposing a thirty-day
the Constitution,"' 9 and then proceed
imprisonment for his contempt of
20
conviction.
Weeks
to affirm the
Where there is such sustained hostile fire from a preeminent
source, surely there is an accurately cited target. Sympathic commentators-to the exclusionary rule, not to Wigmore-have increasingly
10. Id.
11. Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A.
J. 479, 480 (1922).
12. Id. at 482 n.1 (quoting Tucker v. Mississippi, 90 So. 845, 847 (1922)).
13. Id. at 481 n.1.
14. Id. at 482.

15. Id.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 483 n.1.
Id. at 481 n.1.
Id. at 484 (emphasis in original).
Id.

Id.
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joined this insight to Weeks' undeniable lack of empirical generalization-especially regarding what we call "deterrence" and "cost-benefit" analysis-to construct a "principled" basis for suppressing evidence
illegally obtained. The equation is simple: Weeks begat the exclusionary rule and a "principled" rationale begat Weeks. The sum drawn by
the commentators is that exclusion's deterrence value-if any-has no
bearing on the validity of the rule.
Wigmore's inflated rhetoric is a pivotal element of this calculus.
Witnessing the momentous birth, he records that, truly, a bastard was
sired, and thereby verifies the first half of the equation. Indeed, his
Flavius is Cardozo's now legendary "blundering constable,"2 and the
major "principled basis" articles contain extended conversations with
Wigmore, not on whether Weeks articulated the exclusionary rule,22
but on whether it should have.23 Here, Wigmore tends to confirm the
latter half of the calculation as well. He sees emotion, not empiricism,
in Weeks and mentions, without study or measurement, only the obvious detrimental loss of convictions because of the rule. He says nothing
of deterrent "benefit," engages in no balancing whatsoever, and denounces Weeks primarily as a gratuitous mongrelization of the law of
evidence, an ill-conceived attempt to do "justice" on "a street car. '"2
According to Wigmore, the judicial rules of evidence were never meant
to be an indirect process of punishment. A criminal trial is not the
occasion to investigate and correct all injustices that might incidentally
cross its path. While Wigmore would agree, and perhaps seems to say,
that the rule inefficiently promotes compliance with the fourth amendment, it was obviously the well-schooled, traditional, evidence scholar
and not the behaviorist or criminal justice expert in him that resented
Weeks. Friend and notable foe thus concur on the meaning, if not the
soundness, of the decision.
Assent to the Weeks equation permeates not only the past and present commentary, but our Supreme Court as well. That calculation literally framed the discussion in the recent "good faith exception"
cases. 5 The majority in United States v. Leon,2 in accord with recent
precedents, described the exclusionary rule as "'a judicially created
21. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
22.. All commentators, including Wigmore, assume that Weeks did articulate the
exclusionary rule.
23. See Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565
(1983); Schrock & Welsh, Up from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251 (1974). For Wigmore references, see

Kamisar, supra, at 585-88; Schrock & Welsh, supra, at 255 n.16, 328-33, 356.
24. Wigmore, supra note 11,
at 479.
25. United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
104 S.Ct. 3424 (1984).
26. 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).
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remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right
of the person aggrieved.' "127 Not at all surprisingly, the majority did
not respond to Justice Brennan's dissent that deterrence was never a
relevant concern "in the early cases from Weeks to Olmstead." 2 In
fact, the Court's opinion contains not a single reference to Weeks, even
by Justices ordinarily impressed with originalist reasoning and who
have never doubted the familiar claim that the exclusionary rule
originated in Weeks. 9 More impressively, the majority rather brusquely disposed of any ties to pre-Burger Court precedent.3 0 It is a fair
attribution to prefix their (previously quoted) version of the rule with,
"Notwithstanding Weeks . ..

."

"Notwithstanding Weeks" is precisely what rankled Justices Brennan and Marshall who, perhaps unexpectedly for them, mounted an
explicit "original understanding" defense of the exclusionary
rule-original understanding of the rule in Weeks, that is. They quoted
copiously from Justice Day's opinion and, to buttress their reading of
the Weeks case, cited the "principled basis" articles s ' discussed herein.
The dissenting opinion and these articles, stripped to essentials, are
neither more nor less than the Weeks equation.
Thus the rewards of critically evaluating Weeks are apparent. It is
the major contemporary defense of the exclusionary rule and, if established, carries the promise of eternal life, for its cardinal feature is sublime indifference to the vicissitudes of time and experience. As Professor Kamisar succinctly stated: "Until the exclusionary rule rests once
again on a principled basis rather than an empirical proposition, as it
did originally andfor much of its life, the rule will remain in a state of
unstable equilibrium." 2 Moreover, until the rule's antagonists, both on
and off the Supreme Court, stop ignoring and instead adequately respond to this thrust, the dismantling project under way will remain suspect, and any eventual extinction threatens to be temporary. Until the
Weeks equation is honestly dealt with, judicial hostility to exclusion
will continue to be regarded as thinly disguised law-and-order political
conservatism.
The theoretical stakes get even higher. The ante is raised by the
prevailing judicial insistence that the rule is binding upon state officers
27. Id. at 3412 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
28. Id. at 3435 (footnote omitted) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun noted that Weeks "opened" this volume of fourth amendment law. Id. at 3423 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
30. The only cases cited by the majority in support of its "good faith" exception
were Burger Court opinions. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
31. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3432 n.3, 3435 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32. Kamisar, supra note 23, at 565 n.1 (emphasis in original).
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and courts even though it is, in some critical sense, not "part" of the
federal Constitution. "Principled basis" discourse, while motivated
more by solicitude for exclusion itself than for jurisprudential tidiness,
effectively steps into this breach. More interestingly, the anomalous existence of the rule has prompted at least one noted scholar to develop
an original constitutional theory to account for it, 33 and we shall see
that principled basis proponents have similarly tailored theory solely to
justify an exclusionary result. At a minimum, the proper basis for both
the rule and its imposition upon the states is not readily apparent, at
least from the perspective of traditional constitutional theories. Rereading Weeks may cure this defect. This Article critically examines
Weeks to gauge the truth value of (chiefly) the nonempirical defenses
of the rule assertedly stemming from Justice Day's opinion. One of the
major findings is that while Weeks is best understood as a principled
rationale, it does not, pace Wigmore and his conversational partners,
rationalize the exclusionary rule. That is, Weeks is not an exclusionary
rule case. Further, its principled basis is not that attributed to it by
modern "principled basis" apologists. To be sure, the current Court's
"cost-benefit" calculus is also foreign to Weeks, but at least there is no
pretense to the contrary. Obviously then, the relevance of Weeks to
present controversies is different, and more understated, than ordinarily
supposed. But that more subtle teaching is still instructive. The Weeks
rule-that upon a pretrial motion for return of property illegally seized,
a court must order restitution, even if the government is thereby deprived of its use at a subsequent trial 4 -was produced by the familiar
judicial obligation to provide a remedy for every legal injury. This ordinary judicial duty did lead some courts to the exclusionary rule within
a decade or so of Weeks, and many in the years just before Wolf v.
Colorado.3 5 But the account in Part IV of this Article of exclusion's
origins and development after Weeks reveals an incubation period so
doctrinally chaotic that the only intellectually tenable conclusion is a
negative one-there is no identifiable "original understanding" of the
exclusionary rule, and therefore, no justifiable originalist attack upon
prevailing judicial rationales. Stated differently, there has never been a
time when the basis for exclusion has been other than varied, confused,
disputed, and uncertain. Whatever else may be claimed for the various
rationales, an exclusive historical pedigree may not be. The second major conclusion demanded by the formative period of Weeks to Wolf is
also negative: the principled theorists' big play-the so-called personal
right to exclusion-is unsupported, a simple case of imagining the past
33. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Forward: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1975).
34. 232 U.S. at 387.
35. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See Karnisar, supra note 23, at 601-06; Schrock &
Welsh, supra note 23, at 281-89.
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and remembering the future.
Part II of the Article attends to a necessary preliminary: prospecting in the "principled basis" opus for a clear expression of the claim, or
claims, about Weeks to be subsequently investigated. In other words, it
asks, what are the claims advanced, and to what extent are they claims
about, or dependent upon, the Weeks case. The raw materials examined here are the articles by Yale Kamisar and Professors Schrock
and Welsh, and the Leon opinion of their leading judicial champion,
Justice Brennan. This part is perhaps an extended, but necessary prelude, whose chief conclusion is that Weeks claims are indispensable to
the principled basis enterprise because other putatively principled bases
do not withstand critical scrutiny. Part III is about reading and understanding Weeks itself, in its context, not ours. This part demonstrates
that the necessary, critical reliance upon Weeks distilled in Part II is
thoroughly misplaced and that Justice Day's opinion lends no support
to the various interpretations of it proferred by Kamisar and the others.
Part IV confirms this discrepancy by tracing the understanding of
Weeks among contemporary jurists. Specifically, Part IV explores all
the federal and some state cases between Weeks and Wolf to see what
Weeks was taken to mean. This exploration confirms what Part III asserted: Weeks did not say the things we are told it said, and this is
verified by the fact that no one who read Weeks (at least before Wolf)
saw them there. Nor did any of them even mention a "personal right to
exclusion," much less ascribe it to Weeks. Part IV also recounts the
actual development of suppression in the post-Weeks era and examines
its origins. Finally, the Conclusion reevaluates the maligned and misunderstood Wolf decision in light of the advances made in preceding
parts.
II.

A.

CANVASSING

THE "PRINCIPLED BASIS" THEORIES

Kamisar's "PrincipledBasis" Approach

Professor Kamisar's 1983 principled basis article3 is already seminal. Besides the luster it rightly enjoys because of its author's unsurpassed reputation, Justice Brennan featured it in United States v.
Leon37 as supporting a "personal right to exclusion." 88 Additionally,
top shelf constitutional scholars like Laurence Tribe cite it enthusiastically for the same proposition. 9 The article itself is a pungently written, formidable collection of points in service of a non-empirical ground
of exclusion. Indeed, it has the air of the kitchen sink about it. Lumped
Kamisar, supra note 23.
104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984).
Id. at 3433 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Tribe, Constitutional Calcus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98

36.
37.
38.
39.
HARV.

L.

REV.

592, 607 (1985).
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together there with some persuasive arguments is a spate of vapid boilerplate and question-begging, naked restatements of the issue. These
nonarguments may be disregarded without considering their relation, if
any, to Weeks. Justice Brennan echoed some of these bases without
bases in his Leon dissent, and we shall use his more compact expression
of the Kamisarean themes here solely for stylistic ease. Brennan opened
his critique of the "good faith" exception with the allegedly Madisonian insight that the Bill of Rights is judicially enforceable positive
law. ' 0 Similarly, he later remarked that the judiciary is not "exempt"
from the fourth amendment, and that courts must "respect" constitutional rights as surely as the executive must.4 1
One problem is that the initial, more general observation is not
even true. The ninth and tenth amendments, as well as the first half of
the second, are not "law" in any practical sense, and perhaps more of
the Bill of Rights than we admit was intended to have the same precatory status. When limited to the fourth amendment, the claim is true,
but is it not trivial as well? So far as I know, no exclusionary rule
critic, including Wigmore, has suggested that police officers, disabled
by the fourth amendment from arresting Al Capone on less than probable cause, could have called on an "exempt" federal magistrate to
make the pinch for them. Arrests on less than probable cause are unconstitutional, no matter who makes them, even if a judge has issued a
warrant authorizing the seizure. In other words, the question is not
whether courts have fourth amendment duties, but what those duties
are. Most specifically, the inquiry is whether there is a broad fourth
amendment obligation to exclude illegally seized evidence, or whether
that duty is discharged, as Wigmore suggested, by punishing the trespassing constable. Still it is difficult to overstate the mileage principled
basis theorists would cover with this unexceptional observation, and
there are many variations on the theme. A favored version is an out-ofcontext quotation of Justice Holmes' opinion in Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States.42 Without the exclusionary rule, the vital guarantees of the fourth amendment are reduced to nothing more than a
"form of words."' 43 Or in Professor Kamisar's formulation, without the
rule, the guarantees are "'in reality [in]effectual.' ,44
These are largely fancy ways of saying once again that the fourth
amendment is law, not just supplicatory bilge, that it should be observed as if it were law, and that it places some duties upon courts.
Again, no one to my knowledge has denied the above premises, and as
shared premises, they cannot account for the divide over exclusion.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

104 S. Ct. at 3432 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3433.
251 U.S. 385 (1920).
Id. at 392.
Kamisar, supra note 23, at 594.
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Schrock and Welsh's Marbury v. Madison"' argument, also endorsed
by Professor Kamisar," gets no farther from the starting gate. The
exclusionary rule is, assertedly, "simply another name for judicial review." 47 Since the fourth amendment is superior to ordinary police conduct, the Constitution must govern in cases to which both apply.48
Whether this is equivalent to the command to translate the fourth
amendment into practice, as Professor Kamisar suggests, 49 does not
matter. In either event, we are being told once again and, here for the
last time, that courts are under fourth amendment duties. What those
duties are is still the only issue of contention.
A compelling candidate for remainderman is Marbury. Particularly, consider Chief Justice Marshall's general proposition there that
"the very essence of civil liberty" consists in the right of the citizen to
legal protection "whenever he receives an injury." 0 In Marshall's
words, "every right, when withheld must have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress." 51 This is simply the ineradicable, indispensable
core of a legal regime, and is this not at least a connotation of the
"fourth amendment is law" argument? Curiously, and fatefully, Professor Kamisar repudiates this notion as a "principled basis." He says:
"Nowhere in Weeks is the exclusionary rule called a 'remedy' and nowhere in the opinion is there any discussion, or even mention, of the
effectiveness of the exclusionary rule versus the effectiveness of tort
remedies, internal self-discipline or other alternatives."5' (No other
principled basis theorist gainsays Kamisar on this). This is "fateful"
because the Marbury remedial injunction is precisely the basis-and
rather a principled one-on which Weeks rests.53
The paramount principled basis argument is deceptively
unadorned. In Justice Brennan's words, the fourth amendment "comprises a personal right to exclude all evidence secured by means of unreasonable searches and seizures. '5 4 The attempted justifications for
this "exclusionary right," especially the originalist argument from
Weeks, shall be examined shortly. At present, it is important to appreciate just why this position needs to be argued for, notwithstanding the
insistence of reputable fourth amendment scholars that exclusion is an
"inevitable" concomitant of the amendment. No matter. The text will
45. 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137 (1803).
46. See Kamisar, supra note 23, at 591-92.
47. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 23, at 325.
48. Id.

49. See Kamisar, supra note 23, at 591 n.168.

50. 5 U.S. at 164.
51.

Id.

52. Kamisar, supra note 23, at 598.
53. See infra notes 134-202 and accompanying text.
54. Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3433 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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always rebut the first assertion, and "inevitable" is a term out of vogue
even in the physical sciences, which now realize that statistical
probabilities, not necessities, are the stuff of natural forces. It is certainly a term not ordinarily used to explain a constitutional doctrine
that came on the scene within the memory of men still living and may
well pass away before they do.
That textual hurdle is fairly steep. Even in light of exotic modern
definitional efforts, the claim has yet to be made, when a prosecutor
rises from his courtroom chair after examining the arresting officer and
offers the "smoking gun" into evidence, that either a "search" or a
"seizure" is about to occur. Neither the attorney, the witness, nor the
judge in admitting it, is engaged, by any articulated standard, in fourth
amendment activity. If and when that argument is made, it should be
disregarded. For one thing, there is no expectation of privacy in a
weapon that has long since been in police possession. For another, to
characterize the offer as a "search" or "seizure" would only mark the
start of a circular path-would it be "unreasonable" to receive it in
evidence? Even if illegally seized at some past time by the police, does
the court need now make a new calculation of its fourth amendment
obligation of "reasonableness," since a discreet, constitutionally significant event is occurring?
A modified version of the textual argument is less ambitious and
warrants comment. It concedes that the fourth amendment, unlike the
fifth, contains no exclusionary rule, but draws two, presumably helpful,
conclusions. First, because the text is silent, the way is clear to add the
exclusionary rule. Yet it is an odd constitutional theory which supposes
that whatever is not contradicted by the text may, willy nilly, be read
into it. Even so, the question is what justifies this particular amendment. A more reasonable deduction, one made by Professor Kamisar, is
that the absence of a textual niche does not mean that the framers of
the fourth amendment did not intend the exclusionary rule. 85 This,
however, is one case in which the logical sum of two negatives should
be dismissed, unless one cares to defend the implication that what is
absent from the text was therefore intended by the framers. By such
reasoning we might conclude that the framers intended Presidents to
stand on their heads and wave their arms like a chicken while signing
bills into law.
A second, and more subtle argument, again made by Kamisar, has
more logical appeal. By controlling the warrant process via the second
clause of the fourth amendment, the framers believed they had controlled searches." Therefore, they included no exclusionary rule only
because they thought very little, if at all, about after the fact control.

55. See Kamisar, supra note 23, at 576-78.
56. Id. at 578.
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The tight fit between searches and warrants insured that little was left
for post hoc treatment and that the absence of language is not a judgment at all. The framers simply had no "intentions" concerning exclusion. The corollary, and critical, claim is that the growth of warrantless
searches in the realm of twentieth century circumstances authorizes
courts to fashion a controlling device like the exclusionary rule.5"
This argument has several notable features. One is that it literally
abandons textualism, and self-consciously so. Indeed, Professor
Kamisar proclaims that the fourth amendment would be "'an empty
gesture if .

.

..literally applied'

"58

and that courts must be concerned

with "'broad purposes, not specific practices.' "5 Remarkably, he announces that even if only the warrant clause (the second half) of the
amendment had actually been ratified, courts "should" have added the
reasonableness clause to it anyway. 60 Also abandoned then is any comfort gained from arguments, including Kamisar's, which try to show
that the exclusionary rule is really "in" the fourth amendment. The
text is just no longer self-justifying. In fact, as any student of modern
decisions appreciates, the text long ago ceased to be any constraint at
all upon search and seizure law, as the general warrants authorized by
Title II11 and the warrants without particularity, which the Court in
Camara v. Municipal Court"2 required in the fourth amendment's
name, amply demonstrate. There is no problem, so long as these texterasing opinions serve broader purposes. But at a minimum, arguments
from that same faded text are quite inconclusive.
Another problem is that the argument is incomplete. In fact, it is
little more than warmed-over Marbury. At root, it derives from history
the basic command that courts are guardians of the Constitution and
that they must do something effectively to "police the police" under
prevailing conditions. Whether that something need be exclusion is still
not resolved. Most peculiarly, the argument cannot be completed. It is
not principled at all, but precisely the kind of empirical calculation
Kamisar expressly rejects. Whether exclusion more effectively than tort
suits or departmental discipline "deters" police or "remedies" wrongs is
the villain, not the hero, of the story. The exclusionary rule may indeed
be the best way of "keep[ing] pace with the realities of the criminal
57.

Id. at 580.
58. Id. at 574 (quoting E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 55
(1950)).
59. Id. (quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 241 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring)).
60. id.
61. Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
Title 1I, §801, 82 Stat. 212 (1968), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-511 (Oct. 25,
1978) (codified as History: Ancillary Laws and Directives of 18 U.S.C. §2510 (1982)).
62. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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justice system," 8 but the inquiry required to verify that is off-limits to
principled basis defenders. Most ironically, acceptance of the key historical premise-that the number of searches was roughly comparable
to the number of warrants issued-guts the entire project. Why did the

framers include the reasonableness clause at all if it had no empirical
referent to regulate? Was it also intended as no law, but mere
exhortation?
In this scenario, the fourth amendment is a general, virtually un-

bounded commission to courts to do whatever they choose to do in governing search and seizure. The question remains: Why should a court
choose the exclusionary rule, especially if empirical considerations are
ruled out? If the criteria are thought (satisfactorily) to be subjective,
then there is no basis at all upon which to criticize judges who decline
to opt for exclusion, and all arguments, including principled basis ones,
are matters of taste and personal preference. Such an impoverishment

of criminal procedure is just too high a price to pay for the exclusionary rule.

It is therefore probably a minor criticism, but still interesting to
note, that practically all of Kamisar's factual premises are historically
inaccurate. Warrantless searches, then as now, were the rule rather

than the exception, and each of the thirteen colonies, and then states,

as a common statutory practice, authorized them.6" The First Congress,

63. Kamisar, supra note 23, at 580.
64. See, e.g., THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 214-15 (Cushing
1982) (1751 Act) (authorizes sheriffs, constables, grand jurors, and tithing men to arrest without a warrant, upon sight or knowledge, persons traveling unnecessarily on the
Sabbath); id. at 224 (1784 Act) (authorizes sheriffs to arrest without a warrant those
disturbing the peace); id. at 80-81 (1750 Act) (authorizes justices, upon complaint of
forcible entry into any house, to go to the house and arrest such offenders without a
warrant); id. at 258-59 (1750 Act) (permits constables and grand jurors, on public
days of religious solemnity, to search all places suspected of harboring any persons
assembled contrary to law); id. at 23 (1750 Act) (authorizes constables to arrest without a warrant, upon sight or present information of others, persons guilty of drunkenness, profane swearing, Sabbath breaking, vagrants, and unseasonable nightwalkers);
CONN. LAWS, tit. 87 (An Act to Prevent Horse-Racing, and to Repeal the Existing
Statute on that subject," passed Oct. 1803) (authorizes constables and grand jurors to
seize without a warrant any horse used in a race upon which a bet was laid within six

months of the placing of the bet);

ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT,

1716-1749, at 293 (Bates 1919) (1723 Act) (authorizes constables to enter and search
any tavern, to break open any lock or door if necessary, and to arrest offenders of the
Act who refuse to depart when commanded).
THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE,

vol. 2, pt. 2, at 1355 (ch. 134, § 2)

(Cushing.,1981) (1797 Act) (authorizes state-appointed physician to board ships carrying passengers into the state, to search the vessel, and to investigate the health of its
passengers); id. at 1246 (ch. 97, § 18) (1796 Act) (authorizes inspectors and their
deputies to board vessels docked in the ports of New Castle and Port-Penn that store at
least 50 casks of flour and to inspect the flour); id. at 1241 (ch. 97 § 5) (1796 Act)
(authorizes inspectors and their deputies, upon suspicion or request of the buyer, to
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which passed the fourth amendment, also authorized warrantless

inspect casks of flour for sale in the state).
DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

1755-1800, at 411 (Marbury &

Crawford eds. 1802) (Act passed Mar. 4, 1762) (authorizes church wardens and constables to walk through their towns twice on Sunday, to arrest any offenders of the
Sabbath laws, and to enter any public house to search for offenders); id. at 252 (authorizes justices of the peace and constables, upon information from any credible person or
upon personal knowledge or having reasonable or just cause to suspect that persons are
gaming in any licensed public house, to go to such house with two credible persons,
demand admittance, and upon refusal, to break open the doors, and to arrest any persons gaming).
THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND,

ch. 2 (Cushing 1981) (1977)

(permitted any person to arrest without a warrant persons suspected of being deserters
and to carry them before a justice of the peace for examination); id., ch. 20 (1977).
(authorizes the governor and council and magistrates, on their own knowledge or on
information that any male 18 years or older who is a fugitive from another state has
taken shelter in this state, to arrest such persons); id., ch. 23 (1778) (permits the warrantless arrest, during an invasion of the state or an adjoining state, of any person
whose going at large there are good grounds to believe will be dangerous to the state);
id., ch. 17 (1782) (authorizes special commissioners to enter upon the lots, grounds,
and possessions of any person, through which the common sewers run or ought to run).
MASS. LAWS 812-13 (T.B. Wait & Co. 1814) (ch. 45, § 2, 1777 Act) (authorizes
sheriff, under an arrest warrant issued against persons who pose a threat to the safety
of the commonwealth, to break and enter any dwelling that he suspects is harboring
such persons); id. at 826, 826 (ch. 50, 51, 1779 Act) (authorizes selectmen and committees of correspondence members to stop and search any team of horses or boat suspected of violating the Act by transporting certain articles out of the state); MASS.
GEN. LAWS 1780-1798, vol. 1, at 520 (Boston 1823) (ch. 67, § 6, Act passed Mar. 7,
1797) (authorizes inspector to seize without a warrant any baskets used for measuring
coal that fails to conform to Act standards); id. at 170 (ch. 30, 1784 Act) (authorizes
state-council-appointed surveyors to board vessels and conduct warrantless searches of
casks of flax seed to inspect for Act compliance); id. at 200 (ch. 25, Act passed Nov. 8,
1785) (authorizes inspectors to board vessels and conduct warrantless searches of tobacco intended for exploration); MASS. GEN. LAWS (Boston 1814) (ch. 43, § 6, Act
passed May 1776) (permits selectmen of each town to seize citizens' guns for the
army's use if receipt for reimbursement is given); MASS. LAWS 1780-1798, at 391
(Wells, Lilly, Cummings & Hilliard 1823) (ch. 8, § 4) (authorizes inspectors to board
vessels and to conduct warrantless inspections of pot and pearl ashes shipped for exportation and to seize casks of pot and pearl ashes that are not branded according to the
Act's requirements); id. at 497 (ch. 71, § 3) (authorizes citizens who find shellfish that
have been taken from their town and placed on board a noncitizen's boat to seize such
shellfish and keep it for up to 48 hours, at which time it must be attached by due
process).
THE FIRST LAW OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

85 (Cushing 1981) (ch. 1,

1777 Act) (authorizes sheriff, after demanding admittance, to break open any dwelling
house or other building or apartment between sunrise and sunset in which he suspects
any person required to be arrested by an arrest warrant under the Act is concealed); id.
at 132-34 (1778 Act) (authorizes naval officers to go or send searchers on board any
ship at any time without a warrant to investigate compliance with the Act); LAWS OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE, SECOND CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD, vol. 6, 1792-1801, at 593-94
(New Hampshire Secretary of State 1917) (ch. 10, 1799 Act) (authorizes town and
district officers forcibly to stop and detain persons they suspect of traveling unnecessa-
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rily on the Lord's Day, to investigate as to the reasons for the travelling, and if the
responses to such inquiries are insufficient, to detain the persons until a regular trial
can be held); LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD, vol. 5,
1784-1792, at 825 (New Hampshire Secretary of State 1917) (ch. 40, 1791 Act) (authorizes inspectors to make warrantless searches of any ships in their jurisdiction to
search for casks of pot or pearl ashes improperly branded, to seize any improperly
branded casks, and to keep them until trial); id. at 263 (ch. 14, 1787 Act) (authorizes
impost officers or their deputies, without a warrant, to board any vessel coming into
port in the state, to examine the cargo and compare it with the duty report).
DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF NEW JERSEY 1709-1838, at 471 (Luciius Q.C. Elmer
1838) (Act passed Feb. 24, 1797) (authorizes justices, sheriffs or constables, and other
citizens commanded to give assistance to arrest without a warrant any rioters who fail
to disperse after a verbal warning and one hour time period, and forthwith to bring
those arrested before a justice); id. at 586 (Act passed June 10, 1799) (requires constables and authorizes any other person to apprehend, without warrant or process, any
disorderly person and to take him or her before the justice of the peace); id. at 414
(Act passed Mar. 11, 1774) (authorizes the constables or any inhabitants of the colony
to apprehend any idle vagrants or beggars wandering about the county and to bring
them before a justice of the peace); id. at 236 (Act passed Feb. 18, 1813) (permits a
flour inspector to board any vessel between sunrise and sunset to search for flour or
meal he may have reason to suspect was shipped in violation of the Act); id. at 207
(Act passed Nov. 27, 1821) (authorizes inspectors to enter on board any ship without a
warrant to search for herring shipped for exportation); id. at 587 (Act passed Mar. 16,
1798) (authorizes a constable or other citizen to stop offenders of the Sabbath laws and
to detain them until the next day, when they will be dealt with according to the law).
N.Y. LAWS 1777-1784, vol. 1, at 629 (Weed, Parsons & Co. 1886) (authorizes any
person to seize unlawfully kept gunpowder found during any fire or alarm of fire and to
keep it for his own use); id. at 601 (Act passed Mar. 22, 1784) (authorizes collectors,
upon suspicion that a report from a vessel does not accurately reflect the goods therein,
to enter the vessel and search for such goods and to seize any good not accounted for in
the report); id. at 509 (Act passed July 22, 1782) (authorizes any person to seize all
goods that are moving through the state and are thought to be from Great Britain); id.
at 424 (Act passed Nov. 22, 1781) (authorizes a state agent to seize without a warrant
for army use, all hogs fit for pork, grain, and forage, except what is required for the
subsistence of families); id. at 359 (Act passed Mar. 26, 1781) (authorizes any person
to arrest without a warrant hawkers or peddlers); id. at 114 (Act passed Mar. 5, 1779)
(authorizes the administrator of the government, by and with the advice and consent of
six legislature members, whenever he shall conceive the emergency to require it, to
authorize the seizure of any flour, wheat, or meal in the state for the use of the army
and to break and enter into any house, barn, or other place of storage if necessary); id.
at 122 (Act passed Mar. 8, 1779) (authorizes the warrantless seizure by any person of
any goods within the power of the enemy brought into the state without permission
from the state administrator); id. at 19 (Act passed Mar. 14, 1778) (authorizes any
district, precinct, or county committee or peace officer to seize and detain until trial
any flour, meal, or grain suspected of being exported without special license and to
seize and detain the vessel, slaves, cattle, and carriages attempting to export such
items); id. at 68 (Act passed Mar. 16, 1785) (authorizes inspectors to board any vessel
in the harbors of New York to search for flour shipped for exportation arid seize any
casks of flour not branded); id. at 666 (Act passed Apr. 23, 1784) (authorizes inspectors to board any vessel in their districts' harbors to search for and impost pot or pearl
ashes); id. at 10 (Act passed Nov. 18, 1784) (authorizes appointed surveyor and
searchers to go on board every ship coming into their port and to direct a land and tide
waiter to remain until the duty is paid and longer if thought necessary); id. at 490 (Act
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passed Mar. 24, 1787 (authorizes sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, constable marshals, and
watchmen to arrest anyone seen breaking or carrying away glass lamps hung in front of
houses); N.Y. LAWS 1797-1800, vol. 4, ch. 65, at 230 (Weed, Parsons & Co. 1887)
(Act passed Mar. 30, 1798) (requires health officer to enter on board every vessel coming into the port of New York and to make strict search, examination, and inquiry
about the health of those on board and into the state and condition of the vessel and
her cargo); id., ch. 70, at 395 (Act passed Mar. 30, 1799) (authorizes appointed inspectors, between sunrise and sunset, to enter into any building of any kind to examine
the state thereof, whenever, he or they judge that the health of the city may require
any regulations or alterations in that building); id., ch. 97, at 551 (Act passed Apr. 4,
1800) (authorizes inspector of flour and meal to enter on board any vessel between
sunrise and sunset to search for flour or meal that he may have reason to suspect has
been shipped contrary to the Act and to seize any so found).
THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, vol.

1, ch. 4, at 405 (J.

Cushing 1984) (1780 Act) authorizes commissioners to seize the property of British
sympathizers); id. at 406 (1780 Act) (authorizes sheriffs to seize plundered property
brought in from South Carolina); id. at 413 (1781 Act) (authorizes commissioners,
sheriffs, coroners, and justices, when confiscated property has been conveyed out of the
county, to find and seize such property); id. at 503 (1784 Act) (authorizes collectors of
the duty on tonnage to go on board any vessel in order to examine and determine the
tonnage); id., ch. 7 (1777 Act) (authorizes inspectors of tobacco to examine any tobacco brought to a public warehouse and authorizes any person to seize tobacco exported in violation of the Act).
THE FIRST LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 456 (J. Cushing
1984) (1781 Act) (authorizes the Inspector of Bread and Flour and his deputies to
enter any ship to search for flour intended to be transported out of state); LAWS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Vol. 3, 1790-1802, at 177-83 (J. Bioren 1810)
("An Act for the Prevention of Vice and Immorality, and of Unlawful Gaming and to
Restrain Disorderly Sports and Dissipation") (1794) (authorizes justices and magistrates to cause to have arrested without a warrant offenders of the Act).
RHODE ISLAND ACTS AND RESOLVES, 1779 Jan. to 1780 Nov., at 6 (J. Carter
printer) ("An Act To Prevent Desertion," passed Dec. 1779) (authorizes any male inhabitants of the state who detect deserters to arrest them); id., 1771 May (2d) to 1778
Dec., at 8 (Act of June 1778) (authorizes Intendants of Trade to search every vessel
within their districts and to seize any quantity of provisions above that allowed); id. at
10 (Act of May 1778) (authorizes the Major-General to arrest all persons who are
supsected or known to be unfriendly to this state or to the United States); id., 1784
Feb. to 1785 Oct., at 27 (Act of May 1785) (authorizes Collector of Impost or Intendant of Trade, upon suspicion of any vessel failing to report the contents of its hold, to
board such vessel and examine the hold); id. at 42 (Act of Oct. 1785) (authorizes
Collectors of Impost to seize imported goods that are not weighed and marked as required under the Act and to seize the vehicles carrying such goods); id. at 16 (Act of
Aug. 1784) (authorizes a sworn packer of the state to inspect all casks of beef, pork, or
fish before their sale and to mark them if merchantable); id., 1779 Jan. to 1780 Nov.,
at 15 (Act of July 1780) (authorizes any person to arrest without a warrant those
persons who are furthering any unofficial correspondence with the Enemy).
THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Vol. 5, 1786-1814, at 113-14
(Cooper ed. 1839) (1789 Act) (permits state-appointed commissioners to erect warehouses where all tobacco being exported shall first be subject to inspection); id., vol. 4,
1752-1786, at 550-52 (1783 Act) (authorizes a justice of the peace to seize goods unlawfully taken away, or reasonably suspected to have been taken away, from stranded
ships when an unauthorized person attempts to sell the goods).
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, Vol. 1, ch. 62, at 32 (S. Pleasants printer 1814) (Act of Nov.
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searches. 5 Kamisar even suggests that general warrants were condemned only because they were similar to statutes authorizing warrantless searches. 66 This corpus of statutory warrantableness, was, in addition to common-law authority to search incident to arrest
(constitutionally anointed in Weeks) 67 and the general power (prevailing until Payton v. New York 6" and Steagald v. United States)6" to
arrest without prior judicial approval. One may also presume that then,
as now, emergencies trumped the normal warrant requirements. Note
further that all of this occurred in preregulatory regimes with bare16, 1792) (authorizes the governor, with the advice of the state council, to cause to
have arrested any suspicious persons who are subjects of lands that are at war with the
United States); id. at 525 ("An Act to Amend the Act Entitled 'An Act to Prevent
Unlawful Gaming' ") (authorizes magistrates to seize all monies exhibited for the purpose of betting); STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, vol. 12, 1785-1788, at 331-33 (W.
Henning 1823) (authorizes two or more justices of the peace and a sheriff to arrest any
rioters without a warrant).
It is also important to note that many statutes requiring the issuance of a warrant
before certain searches and seizures do not require a probable cause determination and
are in many cases "shorn" warrants. See, e.g., N.Y. LAWS 1777-1784, vol. 1, ch. 29, at
55 (Weed, Parsons & Co. 1886) (Act passed Apr. 2, 1778) (authorizes commander of
the army, during an incursion of the enemy, to issue a warrant at his discretion to take
forage from any inhabitant of the state); MASS. LAWS, ch. XLV, at 812 (T.B. Wait &
Co. 1814) (1777) (authorizes council to issue arrest warrants for any person whom the
council deems a threat to the safety of the commonwealth); id., ch. XLVI, § 1, at 814
(requires justices to issue arrest warrants against persons found to be traitors by a
majority vote of the townspeople).
65. See, e.g., I Stat. 29, 43, Sess. 1, ch. 5, § 23 (1789), identical statute passed
in the next session, I Stat., Sess. 2, ch. 35, § 47 (1790) (authorizes customs officers, on
suspicion of fraud, to open and examine in the presence of two or more reputable
merchants any packages of goods to check that accurate entries of the contents were
made and to seize any packages found that differ in their contents from the entry); I
Stat. 29, 43, Sess. 1, ch. 5, § 24 (1789), identical statute passed in the next session, 1
Stat. Sess. 2, ch. ch. 35 § 48 (1790) (authorizes collectors, naval officers, surveyors and
appointed persons to enter any vessel in which they have reason to suspect that goods
subject to a duty are concealed and to search for and seize such goods); I Stat. 29, 43,
Sess. 1, ch. 5, § 26 (1786), identical statute passed in the next session, I Stat., Sess. 2,
ch. 35 § 50 (1790) (permits officers authorized under the Act to conduct searches and
seizures to do so outside as well as within their respective districts); 1 Stat. 199, 205206, Sess. 3, ch. 15, § 26 (1791) (authorizes supervisors of the revenue for the districts
in which there are distilleries of any kind to conduct warrantless inspections of such
distilling operations and to take an exact count of the spirits therein to enter into his
books); I Stat. 93., Sess. 1, ch. 21, § 2 (1789) (states that the forms of writs and
executions and modes of process in federal court shall be the same in each state respectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the same); 1 Stat. 73, 91,
Sess. 1, ch. 20, § 33 (1789) (authorizes the arrest of criminals against the United
States by any justice of the peace or other magistrate of any of the states where the
criminal may be found, using the usual mode of process against offenders in that state).
66. Kamisar, supra note 23, at 574.
67. 232 U.S. at 392.
68. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
69. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:1031

bones nonprofessional law enforcement networks. While it remains true
that the framers did not contemplate suppression, it cannot be because
the warrant process mooted the general problem of what to do about
illegal searches. Even if Kamisar's general observations were accurate,
the framers still needed a mechanism for redressing illegal execution of
warrants and for constables who search without the requisite judicial
approval. Kamisar fails to appreciate that, at most, only a standard of
liability was established. Articulating the law does not insure that everyone will in fact observe it. Then, as now, there is the problem of
dealing with constables who blunder. In reality, tightening up the warrant process only solved the problem of judicially authorized abusive
general warrants and nothing more. Further, there is no evidence whatsoever in the period preceding and including the fourth amendment's
adoption that anything besides general warrants were on the people's
minds.70 And it simply will not do blithely to ignore the "ancient rule"
of Adams v. New York 71 admitting tainted evidence. If the conjunction
of illegally seized property and criminal trial did not become common
until recently, how could the "rule" be "ancient" by 1904?
Returning to the earlier point, Professor Kamisar repeats his error
in striking back at Wigmore. For what it is worth, Kamisar notes that
Wigmore's "'contempt of the Constitution' "72 action is no more textually demonstrable than exclusion." Distinct, but similar, is his claim
that other remedies and enforcement tools, such as tort suits and institutional discipline, no more follow from the Constitution than the
Weeks rule.74 Both are conclusions flowing from a single premise: "the
fourth amendment has nothing to say about any consequences that
might flow from its violation . .

. ."

In other words, the amendment

does not contradict the exclusionary rule. But then neither does Moby
Dick. Whether Melville or the Constitution justifies suppression is a
different, and still unanswered, question. Here Kamisar seems to have
forgotten precisely what it is he is trying to justify: that the rule is
constitutionally necessary, not just constitutionally permissible, and so
no ground at all has been gained. The entire account may even be reducible to Marbury's dictum to develop an appropriate remedy for constitutional wrongdoing, 76 a matter of judicial implication in light of
70. See Bradley, The Reasonableness Clause as Mere Exhortation: Is There Really a Constitutional Invitation to Fashion a Common Law of Search and Seizure?,
(forthcoming).
71. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
72. Kamisar, supra note 23, at 585 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2184,
at 40 (3d ed. 1940)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 598.
75. Id. at 585 (emphasis in original).
76. 5 U.S. at 164.
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changing circumstances. Unfortunately, Kamisar has expressly eschewed this "remedial" description of the exclusionary rule.
It is not that Kamisar is now back to square one-he is behind it.
By this point, the only contention firmly established is that the text is
irrelevant to the exclusionary rule controversy. Not only is it "silent," it
is totally without authority because Kamisar has robbed it of any objective force. Instead, he has proclaimed it the basis upon which judges
may rely in fashioning the "just" regime of search and seizure. Indeed,
even if exclusion were written in bold face across the front page of the
Constitution, Kamisar has succeeded only in justifying its disregard by
any court convinced that, in the present climate, it is no longer right or
"effective."
One is thereby relieved of seriously entertaining certain other portions of his article. Specifically, his critical linguistic comparison of the
first and fourth amendments"7 and contra-Wigmore propositions rooted
in the text 78 are refuted by his own constitutional methodology. That
method may even neuter his entire opus--constitutional authority resides in the well-informed, sensitized judicial conscience. The resemblance here to the wider "fundamental values" debate in constitutional
theory is striking, and the wages of judicial subjectivism are no less
formidable. According to the norms of Kamisar's article, the fourth
amendment orders judges to do what they think is right. If they are
appalled by the use in a criminal proceeding of evidence illegally obtained from the defendant, they must prevent it. If it is simply wrong
(and this is precisely the rationale of the Olmstead v. United States7 9
dissent relied upon by Kamisar 8 and others), there is sufficient warrant
for judicial intervention. The problem, of course, is that while this may
justify exclusion, it also justifies its opposite. It is akin to the
Frankfurteric "shock-the-conscience" test of Rochin v. California8 1
More prosaically, if the judicial stomach is turned, the Constitution is
offended. But what if another Justice is more appalled at letting the
77. See Kamisar, supra note 23, at 588. Kamisar embraces the views of Atkinson and Dellinger, which attach significance to the first and the fourth amendments'
similar affirmative language. The outcome of this linguistic analysis is that the language used means that the government should do nothing to impair the private rights
granted in those amendments.
78. See id. at 585-88. Wigmore read the fourth amendment as granting an implied private civil action and a criminal contempt claim against the offending officials.
Id. at 585. Kamisar dismisses Wigmore's "contempt of the Constitution" enforcement
remedy as a "Draconian device" and states that Wigmore's reading is no less a "creative" or "judge-made" reading of the fourth amendment than is Weeks. Id. at 587-88.
79. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
80. Kamisar, supra note 23, at 607.
81. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (law enforcement officials forced defendant to have
his stomach pumped in an effort to secure evidence of narcotics).
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guilty go free? Is she not equally justified? And what of the Justice
whose sturdier digestive tract allows him to view either prospect without vomiting, but wants an intellectually satisfying reason for the
course chosen? The difficulty is that if everything is justifiable, including burial of the exclusionary rule, the Constitution is incapable of misinterpretation. Needless to add, a methodology able to affirm and deny
the same proposition with equal facility needs reexamination. At a minimum, Kamisar has now set himself a yeoman's task-he must adduce
a principled but nontextual justification for the exclusionary rule.
The remainder of Kamisar's non-Weeks arguments may also be
dispatched, though not quite as summarily. Part of the delay resides in
the fuzziness of his claims. At one point, Kamisar assumes that even if
the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence does not violate the fourth
amendment, the due process clause is evidently still offended." Reasoning that courts must eventually assess the police conduct, general due
process principles, and the nature of our criminal justice system yields
this synthesis: "Challenging the legality of a search or seizure at some
stage of the criminal process-when it is practicable to do so-means
the exclusionary rule. That's all the exclusionary rule means." 83
If so, then "all" is certainly not enough. Nor is the deficit erased
by the apparently corollary maxim that, but for the exclusionary rule,
there would be no adversary testing of the police procedure.8, Implicit
in the latter claim is the observation that, but for the exclusionary rule,
there might be a systemic dearth of interested parties with sufficient
incentive to litigate the search and seizure. Only the latter assertion is
novel. The due process argument simply stirs together some familiar
ingredients-that "courts must police the police," that "courts are
bound by the Constitution," and the fourth amendment must be "effectual" -in the synergistic hope that, somehow, a magic elixir labelled
"exclusion" can be concocted. Alas, the alchemist's dream is yet unrealized, and the whole does not exceed the sum of the parts. But there
may still be a golden nugget here. Surely the pretrial suppression proceeding is a convenient vehicle by which to transport these various aspirations. Without exclusion, would there in fact result a system in which
the fourth amendment was but "a mere form of words"? Perhaps, but I
doubt it. The problem is that the exclusionary rule that we-do have
induces only a tiny fraction of aggrieved parties to pursue suppression.
Why? Most obviously, "innocent" search victims, that is, those from
whom no evidence is seized, are conclusively cut off from it by the absence of criminal proceedings against them. "Guilty" search victims, on
the other hand, are practically cut off. In a regime in which ninety
82.
83.
84.

Kamisar, supra note 23, at 596.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 597.
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percent or more of the prosecutions are resolved through plea bargaining, little litigation of any kind actually occurs, especially if there are
search issues in the case. The defendant with an arguably legitimate
search grievance has bargaining leverage in the bank; he will summon
a more attractive plea offer precisely because the prosecutor faces dismissal if litigation ends unfavorably for her.
In any event, the fatal counterpunch to principled basis theorists is
that these are all empirical questions: Do police, in fact, observe fourth
amendment constraints in a suppression regime more than they did, or
would, in one in which the "high-handed constable" is thrown into the
slammer or, more realistically, is suspended without pay for sixty days?
Indeed, as Professor Kamisar adverts, one virtue of the exclusionary
rule is that it does not very effectively constrain police officers who,
after all, escape the fray personally unscathed. To put the point (and it
is one we shall return to) differently, these are deterrence questions,
and there are, as Wigmore suggested, many more effective ways to deter police illegality than the exclusionary rule. Overwhelmingly principled is Kamisar's generic claim that the government should not profit
from its wrongdoing. 85 Even if the Weeks opinion fails to incorporate it
into fourth amendment law, its intuitive appeal was sufficient for Dean
Wellington to deploy it as a classic "principle" of common-law adjudication,8" and perhaps it ought to justify the exclusionary rule. One obstacle is a familiar, purely theoretical one: what is the warrant for locating this particular ethical judgment in a constitutional, as opposed
to a common-law, calculus? A warrant is necessary, for no one claims
general constitutional authority to exclude evidence unethically secured. The notion that it would be unethical to receive unconstitutionally secured evidence is similar enough to require support, and the formulation does have, as Chief Justice Burger remarked, a "sporting
contest" flavor to it. The government must play fair or lose the game. 87
Further, into the twentieth century and well past Weeks, the government was generally not liable for the unconstitutional behavior of its
police agents.
More problems attend Kamisar's precise formulation. "The government whose agents violated the Constitution should be in no better
position than the government whose agents obeyed it . . . ."" But this
"unjust enrichment" theme is hardly a ratchet: is it more ethically
palatable that the criminal go free when the constable blunders? Many
would say that it is not. Further, the pure ethical command is twice
85. See id. at 593.
86. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 222-29 (1973).
87. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 414 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
88. Kamisar, supra note 23, at 593.
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removed from the final Kamisar rendition. That one should not profit
from one's own wrongdoing might apply if the real profitmaking party
were the wrongdoer, but neither the offending agent, nor its government employer bears the consequences. The community of mostly lawabiding people does. The strawman of the remote regime plays his part
here most effectively, for the proffered ethical calculation is calculated
to obscure what the maligned Cardozoism seeks to illumine: the exclusionary rule is uniquely ill-suited to apportion moral opprobrium to
those most deserving of it. A better place to balance equities is the
ordinary remedial equation. The defendant may indeed be made whole
and, more importantly, all "profit" incentive eliminated without invoking the exclusionary rule.
B,

The Schrock and Welsh "Evidentiary Transaction" Model

What appear to be the remaining thrusts of Professor Kamisar's
article provide a convenient transition to discussing the thesis propounded by Professors Schrock and Welsh. Kamisar's twin
claims-that the rule is an exercise of "defensive judicial review" 89 and
that admission is a "distinct constitutional violation" 90 -are so similar
to each other and so grounded in the latter's work that they are best
examined along with their general propositions. Critically, the work of
Schrock and Welsh is largely, but certainly not entirely, an interpretation of Weeks. They described the relationship as follows: "We do not
attribute to [Justice] Day all the reasoning we set forth here. We only
claim that, while the reasoning is our own, it has been prompted by our
reading of the Weeks opinion, is consistent with it, and is perhaps demanded by it." 91 We shall investigate the Weeks claims later. For now,
their thesis and any value attributable to it, independent of its Weeks
pedigree, are the tasks at hand.
The end result of their exegetical efforts is the discovery of an exclusionary right grounded in the fourth amendment that guarantees the
criminal defendant a personal constitutional right to have unconstitutionally seized evidence excluded from his trial. The conclusion is endorsed by Professor Kamisar,' 2 as well as by Justice Brennan in Leon,93
where it is repeated almost verbatim. More important, while Weeks
looms large in Justice Brennan's justificatory universe, he specifically
endorses the rationale of Schrock and Welsh as well.94 That reasoning
is in fact attributed to Justice Day, but can be expressed and evaluated,
89. Id. at 592.
90. Id. at 595.
91. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 23, at 297.
92. See Kamisar, supra note 23, at 595.
93. 104 S. Ct. at 3433 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 3432 n.3.
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shorn of its Weeks connection.
So barbered, much of the reasoning sounds familiar. Exclusion is
the way the court itself avoids committing a wrong by violating the rule
of law. Or it is the "only appropriate and timely method the court has
to show its respect for the rule of law." 95 The difficulty with the obvious
connotations has been explored, but the authors provide a unique gloss
that lends new meaning. That gloss is the "unitary model" of government, starkly and unalterably opposed to the "fragmentary" conception
beneath the deterrence-based theories of Justice Powell, for example.
"[P]ioneered in Weeks," ' this model asserts "an indissoluble institutional and moral tie between the Courts and the executive." 9 This
"conceptual linkage" between seizure and use of evidence produces
an
"evidentiary transaction," including search and trial, which is the subject of fourth amendment protection." Thus, the amendment itself is
permitted to speak directly and not derivatively as "enforcer" or remedy-giver, to the admitting court. In contrast, the discarded "fragmentary" model allegedly designates the executive as "sole addressee" of
the amendment, because it alone actually invades privacy by searching
and seizing. 99 Hence, the constitutional violation is, in a critical sense,
"complete" before judicial activity commences. The proffered unity is
then ultimately in aid of a rarefied, pure textualism. The language plus
the indissoluble nexus yields an explicit injunction. For the authors, as
well as Justice Day whom they claim as confrere, "the rule [is] not 'an
enforcement tool,' but was itself a 'Fourth Amendment guarantee.' "lo
It does not "'give content and meaning' to the. . . amendment. . ., it
is part of that meaning." 1'0 (The antinomies are theirs, not mine).
We shall critically examine the effective substitution of "evidentiary transaction" for "search and seizure" shortly, but attention to its
details should not obscure that, effectively, it is the alchemist's dream
come true. A constitutional provision speaking only of search and
seizure, which are confessedly foreign to the judicial office, nevertheless
speaks directly to judges. Notably, this interpretative event is not mediated by traditional extratextual sources such as historical understanding or intention, governmental practice, precedent (at least before
Weeks), tradition, consensus in the contemporary community, existing
philosophical systems, or even the raw judicial preferences that have
occasionally made the Constitution say unexpected things. Indeed,
those sources are all rather more supportive of the "fragmentary"

95. Schrock & Welsh, supra note 23, at 257.

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

258, n.25.
258.
281.
295.

100. Id. at 288 (emphasis in original).
101. Id. (emphasis in original).
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model implicit in the "ancient rule" of Adams. Interest in the warrants
for reading the amendment by the unitary model's light predictably
runs high. Even Schrock and Welsh effectively concede that upon its
acceptance rests their entire argument. The key justificatory passage is
as follows:
The unitary, "evidentiary transaction" theory implicit in Justice
Day's opinion insists upon a fourth amendment exclusionary duty
and right because it assumes a conceptual and moral connection between the trial court and the evidence-seizing police. This connection
exists because every search for or seizure of evidence points beyond
itself to use at trial. Search, seizure, and use are all part of one
"evidentiary transaction," and every such transaction presupposes a
court as well as a policeman. Because the court is integral to the
evidentiary transaction, it cannot insulate itself from responsibility
for any part of that transaction, and specifically not from responsibility for the manner in which evidence is obtained. The only way
the court can avoid consummating an unconstitutional course of conduct in which, wittingly or unwittingly, it has been involved from the
beginning, is to abort the transaction by excluding the evidence. To
admit the evidence is for the court to implicate itself in the unconstitutional police misconduct and to violate the Constitution."0 2
Before unpacking this intriguing account, two caveats are necessary.
The less important is the authors' unqualified rejection of "judicial integrity" rationales. 08 Supportable connotations arising from "unwitting
consummation" and avoiding "implication" in police misconduct suggest the presence of a "clean hands" justification. Nevertheless, it, and
opinions like the Olmstead dissents that rely on it, are abandoned.
More critically, and this time despite contrary intimations by Schrock
and Welsh, the burden of proof is on them.
The confusion of that issue is aggravated by persistent attribution
of the "fragmentary" model to the polemical endeavors of Justice Powell, rather than to the Constitution itself. Powell "tries to read" that
model into the fourth amendment; it is Powell's "thesis" that the authors' "evidentiary transaction" is illusory. 10 4 Elsewhere, Justice Powell
(and not the text) "denies" the "exclusionary right" theory, and "fragments the government as much as possible."' 1 5 "[I]n other words, fragmentation of the transaction is as arbitrary as fragmentation of the
government."'10 6 Indeed, but no less so, and if by "arbitrary" the authors mean "stipulated by the Constitution," as in the separation of
powers, they are quite right. For it is here worth noting, and it is not
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 298-99 (footnote omitted).
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

265.
294-95.
294.
302.
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mere obduracy to insist, that the amendment actually says "search and
seizure," and is not, literally or "thematically ' 10 7 (to use their term)
concerned with "evidentiary transactions." Further, the hardly novel
observation that searches and seizures are frequently a prelude to court
proceedings did not prompt the framers to condemn "evidentiary transactions," a concept that appears to have occurred to no one, in any
form, before Justice Day in 1914. Nor will emphatic repetition of "indissolubility" and "inseparability" prevent us from continuing to think
in "fragmentary" modes unless, or until, a persuasive reason for recasting our thoughts is provided. It is easy to conceptualize seizure and
admission at trial as discrete events, and the great weight of the evidence suggests that the fourth amendment, along with Justice Powell,
does so. And it is idle to suggest, as the authors do, that the fragmentary model is wedded to the notion that the executive is the "sole addressee," as if the obvious inadequacies of that formulation supported
their one government model. Again, no one, to my knowledge, has ever
denied that all three branches bear fourth amendment duties. After all,
the courts are the "sole addressees" of the warrant clause, for they
alone issue warrants.
The tripartite division of governmental responsibility evidences the
naivetXe of these dichotomous formulations. And the authors' slighting, if not bludgeoning, of separation of powers principles is the first
crack in their unitary model. Simply substitute, as the authors do, "evidentiary transactions" for "search and seizure" and see what happens.
Now, a court that is ordinarily supposed to possess no "general supervisory" power over criminal justice (especially in the states because of
the added weight of federalism concerns) most assuredly does. Where
the fourth amendment heretofore authorized the Court to fashion a
common law of search and seizure with constitutional status, it now
requires a common law of evidentiary transactions. The changes so
wrought are enormous. When "search" and "seizure" were operative
words of limitation, discussion of canine sniffs, 10 8 beepers,10 9 pen registers,11 0 physical surveillance, 1 1' and "plain view '"112 was animated by
the immunity conferred in decreeing them "not searches." That is all
academic now, for they are surely evidence gathering techniques, even

107.

Id. at 300.

108. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) ("sniff test" of luggage by
a narcotics detection dog was not a fourth amendment search).
109. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (monitoring via beepers
was not a search or seizure).
110. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (use of pen register was not a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment).
111. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
256-57 (5th ed. 1980).
112. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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if they are not searches. They are productive of evidentiary transactions
and thus susceptible to judicial regulation in the name of reasonableness. More generally, all police investigative activity previously shielded
from judicial oversight by the Katz v. United States'" "expectation of
privacy" and United States v. Place" 4 "search" doctrines for instance,
is now prodded into the sunlight of judicial scrutiny. While this result
may be welcome news to some, including perhaps Schrock and Welsh,
it surely reveals the considerable inconsistency between prevailing bedrock fourth amendment principles and what the authors now claim the
text actually says.
Frisbie v. Collins," 6 holding that the defendant is not a "suppressible fruit," is now an easy case too. Where courts faced with the problem of the illegally seized defendant have all but universally declined to
"exclude" the body-and thereby dismiss the prosecution-the text
now tells them to do just that. Since there is no question that such
seizures occur for the sole purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, the conceptual link between seizure and prosecution is empirically
airtight. For instance, no longer need federal courts worry about their
authority to decline jurisdiction expressly vested in them by Congress,
for separation of powers is overcome by the unitary model. Or if Congress retains authority, notwithstanding the fourth amendment's "thematic content," to compel entertainment of the prosecution, why does
not its power to prescribe rules of evidence for the federal courts overcome the similarly grounded right to exclude evidence?
If Frisbie is an easy case, so presumably is Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics." 6 While the situations
are only analogous, once congressional power over jurisdiction is subordinated to the revamped fourth amendment, there is at least no obstacle to recognizing a cause of action "implied" by the amendment. The
article II doctrine of prosecutorial discretion is also endangered by this
loosening of doctrinal bonds."' While its pedigree and contours have
never been precisely articulated, the Supreme Court has frequently asserted that some prosecutorial decisionmaking, such as whether to prosecute, what charges to lodge, and whether to withdraw charges, is an
executive function not amenable to judicial control, except in discrete,
carefully justified, and delineated instances." 8 No more. With a com113.
114.
115.
116.

389
462
342
403

117.

See generally Bradley, Law Enforcement and the Separation of Powers,

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

347
699
519
388

(1967).
(1983).
(1952).
(1971). See supra text accompanying note 87.

(forthcoming).
118. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973);
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mon law of evidentiary transactions comes a common law of prosecution. If police and courts are "conceptually indissoluble," what about
prosecutors caught in between? They are simple conduits. All they do
is present evidence before courts. Presumably, unreasonable
prosecutorial behavior is now condemned by the fourth amendment.
The troubled life of Miranda v. Arizona' 9 is also soothed, if not as a
fifth amendment case, than as a fourth amendment one. So long as
search and seizure are robbed of privacy invasion connotations, which
is the primary aim of the Schrock and Welsh analysis, police-suspect
conversation, and not just "confessions," coerced or otherwise, easily fit
the evidentiary transaction mold. Such exchanges are at least as "inseparable" from evidence gathering for trial as seizures of tangible objects, and probably more so. A common law of witness statements, including but not limited to suspects, and with constitutional potency is
thereby authorized. Miranda may be a troubled technique for ferreting
out "involuntary" confessions, but surely it passes muster as a "reasonableness" requirement. For that matter, the authors' unitary model
neuters sixth amendment confession doctrines, especially the pre- and
post-indictment hinge. 120 Such textbound, talismanic analyses are subsumed by the new fourth amendment colossus.
If only a fraction of these logical consequences were actually to
occur, the "one government" model would explode upon the 'constitutional scene with enough destructive force to pulverize the infrastructure of criminal procedure, if not all constitutional law. But the authors
neither appreciate nor pay the price of their Rambo jurisprudence. It is
not so much that they do not account for the perhaps unwitting effects
of their work, it is that the destructive effects are gratuitous because,
when all is said and done, the fourth amendment still does not contain
an exclusionary rule. Put differently, they painstakingly, if not successfully, establish that courts are direct, nonderivative addressees of the
amendment, but it turns out that the amendment has nothing to say to
them. Assuming that the text forbids "unreasonable evidentiary transactions" and that it therefore, contains a "personal right to exclusion"
separate and distinct from an earlier privacy invasion, one would expect
some separate and distinct analysis of that right. That is, if distinguishable rights are doing business together as one amendment as, for example, in the first, fifth, sixth, and eighth amendments, distinguishable
analyses should emerge. One asks-without response-what actually
makes admission "unreasonable." Under what circumstances is the receipt of illegally seized evidence "reasonable"? What is the scope of
Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
119.
120.

636-65.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
See generally Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE &

J. ISRAEL,

supra note 111, at
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the exclusionary right? Does it apply to all judicial proceedings and, if
so, why? In short, what reflective process is supposed to occur in the
judicial brain prior to exclusion of evidence?
Quite clearly, the answer is none, and that is why the proposed
way of thinking is ultimately senseless. Schrock and Welsh explicitly
require exclusion each and every time, without exception, there has
been an antecedent unlawful invasion of privacy by the police or, in
other words, when there has been an illegal "search" or "seizure. "121
The rule is thus completely derivative after all, but the triggering
events have been analytically annihilated. Having conditioned us to
think "thematically" along a continuum of "evidentiary transactions,"
and to stop thinking of discrete events called "searches" and
"seizures," the authors now rely exclusively upon the displaced terms.
Reconceptualization is one thing, but blithe indifference to contradiction at the center is still a flaw in any way of thinking. Schrock and
Welsh insist on effacing the language of the text long enough to
squeeze trials and judges into it, but then invest the faded words with
the same talismanic significance they originally, and in the authors'
opinion, unjustifiably possessed.
Intellectual honesty requires one to pay the piper. Here the cost is,
presumably to the authors, prohibitive. They justify the exclusionary
rule on its own ground and as precisely what they proclaim it to
be-admission is condemnable as, or at as least part of, an unreasonable evidentiary transaction. In either event, they must explain why, for
example, even a reasonable mistake of law by a well-intentioned officer
always conclusively taints a separable trial decision. What if this constable's blunder sets a murderer free? Is it an obviously "unreasonable"
evidentiary transaction to admit the evidence anyway? Indeed, the
longer and more complex the continuum, the less amenable it is to the
absolute judgment of "unreasonableness" the authors wish to justify.
When a flaw in one pole of a transaction, the acquisition, literally determines the result at the other end, exclusion, we have not changed
our thinking after all. An illegal search and seizures triggers exclusion.
And we are left still wondering, why? The only event of constitutional
and analytic significance continues to be the initial police misconduct.
That The
is what Justice Powell has been saying all along.
invitation to rethink the fourth amendment should
be declined
for further, just as powerful reasons. Returning to the central justificatory passage, Schrock and Welsh's "indissoluble connection" rests upon
an empirical observation buttressed by a single inference. As a matter
of experience, every search or seizure points beyond itself, or contemplates use at trial. Consequently, there is a single evidentiary transaction in the event, and the amendment condemns an entire transaction.

121.

Schrock & Welsh, supra note 23, at 303.
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Since the text does not so read, the critical inference is supplied by the
one government or unitary model. As best I can decipher, the notion is
as follows: what is in fact joined by contemplation or some other unity
is or should be joined in constitutional analysis. Unfortunately, the inference just does not follow.
Consider a few examples that are hardly hypothetical. Congress
goes to a great deal of trouble appropriating money and articulating
budget allocations, surely "contemplating" that the money will be so
spent. Yet there is the constitutional problem of executive impoundment. Also, Congress may allocate some of this money to the army and
navy it has raised to fight the war it has duly declared. Yet the President, as commander-in-chief, may refuse to commit troops to actual
combat. Congress also writes criminal laws and gives money to Justice
Department prosecutors expecting that criminals will, at least ordinarily, be prosecuted. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court suggests that
neither Congress nor the judiciary can control the executive's exercise
of prosecutorial discretion. With respect to Congress, that position is, in
my view, well overstated. That there is tension, conflict, incomplete or
divided authority or, in other words, fragmentation, in the constitutional structure, is to say that there is a separation of powers which is
neither airtight nor exhaustively delineated. And what is more, this
built-in uncertainty is frequently thought of as a virtue of our Constitution. It is simply not a self-justifying, working premise of constitutional
interpretation to "unify" what the Constitution has "fragmented." One
may do so, but only after persuasive argument.
More vulnerable is the empirical base itself. The "conceptual and
moral connection" argued for "exists because every search for or
seizure of evidence points beyond itself to use at trial. 1 22
"[Elvidentiary seizures . . . make no sense without an expectation of
judicial use."' 23 "[A] policeman . . . being out there in a law enforcement . . . capacity is only intelligible on the expectation that he will

come in to court.

' 124

Furthermore, "one can understand what

. . .

the

marshal does when he makes searches and seizures in lawful guise, only
by reference to a court." 125 While these formulations may have slightly
varying nuances, they are obviously intended by Schrock and Welsh to
convey the same crucial, core observation.
It is therefore noteworthy that the observation is irredeemably
flawed. To begin with, only seizures have the theoretical capacity to
give rise to the proffered expectations because unproductive searches do
not yield anything to be used in court. Yet searches remain prototypi-

122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 298.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 300 (emphasis in original).
Id.
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cal fourth amendment activity without any relation to courts. The
available field of inquiry can be further narrowed at the outset. The
authors are not referring to all seizures, but rather to seizures of inanimate entities. Their discussion is about "judicial use," "evidentiary
transactions," and "excluding evidence." They are obviously factoring
out seizures of persons, including arrests of defendants. In any event,
many seizures, such as on the street detention for brief investigative
purposes or pure harassment, occur without the requisite contemplation
of judicial proceedings, and arrests by themselves do not lead to exclusionary consequences. Only a fraction of police search and seizure efforts is even available to support assertions about all searches and
seizures.
Further difficulties diminish even this remainder, with one previously mentioned general gloss casting a giant shadow over their claim.
In the real world of plea bargaining that we inhabit, police officers need
not contemplate "judicial use" of seized evidence. They may reasonably
think of theirs as the job of acquiring leverage for negotiations. While
courtroom proceedings, even trial, are always a possibility, the actualities of criminal justice allow officers to operate with little expectation
that a judge will ever be asked to admit the fruits of their seizures as
trial evidence. What is left of the authors' beleaguered observation is
further whittled down by the realities of modern policing. For instance,
the authors ignore all seizures in which the mere act of confiscation
satisfies police objectives. Self-protective frisks and seizures of weapons
contemplate self-preservation, not prosecution. Police officers routinely
disarm potentially hostile persons in crowds gathered about an arrest
12 6
scene out of fear, not prescribed duty. The facts of Ybarra v. Illinois
are illustrative here. Officers, armed with a warrant to search a particular individual, executed the warrant in a crowded bar. 127 Everyone in
the bar was frisked,128 no doubt as a precaution more than as a prelude
to prosecution. In addition, much contemporary urban policing strives
to disarm the populace generally, especially young men. The weapons
seized are frequently thrown away or end up collecting dust in police
lockers. Still, law enforcement objectives are satisfied.
Drug seizures also evidence the rewards of mere confiscation. A
large scale pusher can be run out of business, if not into jail, by seizing
his stash and throwing it away. On a less ambitious scale, individual
(frequently young) buyers are shaken down by officers seeking information precisely in exchange for not going to court with the seized drugs.
Officers frequently accost buyers and take their drugs with only the
expectation that intelligence, not evidence, may be gathered. Stolen
126.
127.
128.

444 U.S. 85 (1979).
Id. at 87-88.
Id. at 88.
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goods are another illustration. Even if no one is prosecuted, their return
to rightful ownership is part of police routine. Ironically, full understanding of the realities of police behavior more likely supports the
view that officers ordinarily conduct search and seizure operations as if
they never, rather than always, had to go to court. This is hardly a
matter of oversight. Police trainees learn, if not formally then informally, largely to disregard the litigation consequences of their acts. The
reasoning may well be shared by a majority of the ordinary population
from which the recruits are drawn: because the rules of criminal procedure are seen as either so morally perverse or so out of touch with
reality, or both, the only way to do the job of policing is not to worry
about what lawyers and judges will say. Another facet of police culture
distressingly overlooked by Schrock and Welsh adds to the at least relative indifference of officers to trial results. Successful, productive officers are generally known by the quantity of arrests they make. A "big
collar" man, an officer who makes a lot of arrests, is a "good cop." In
addition, informal "quotas" assigned to officers and detectives by their
supervisors are for arrests, not convictions. Finally, it is frequently true
from an economic perspective that an arrest, regardless of conviction,
makes sense because arrests, especially if made late in an officer's regular tour of duty, lead to overtime pay.
But Schrock and Welsh make an even bigger, this time, categorical mistake. They proffer a connection between "search and seizure"
and judicial use. Their proof consists entirely of estimates (vastly overstated) of some police activity. The problem is that the police establishment is only one of many fourth amendment agencies. In the present
regime to which the authors make reference, neither police officers nor
"law enforcement" generally enjoy a monopoly on searches and
seizures. After Katz, any governmental actor who defeats a legitimate
expectation of privacy engages in fourth amendment activity. Teachers
and school administrators, 2 9 as well as welfare bureaucrats' 3 0 and firemen, 1 ' conduct "searches" these days, and the degree to which they
"expect" judicial use of things seized is certainly less than total.
These are all, of course, among the reasons why the exclusionary
rule is at most a marginal deterrent of police misconduct, which is why
the authors' argument is practically self-refuting. If police officers were
so "indissolubly" wedded to judicial proceedings, a principled basis
would be unnecessary since deterrence would unquestionably justify the

129. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (searching of purse of high
school student suspected of drug dealing was reasonable search).
130. Cf Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (requirement of home visit in
order to receive welfare benefits was a search not within the protection of the fourth
amendment).
131. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (no warrant necessary to enter
property to fight fire or to remain for a reasonable time to investigate cause of blaze).
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rule. That a principled basis is sought implicitly concedes that deterrence is a shaky foundation for exclusion. In other words, if the evidentiary transaction were empirically verified, there would be no need to
insert it in the Constitution as a "way of thinking" about the law.
Highlighting the precariousness of the project highlights the necessity
of Weeks to it. If Justice Day's opinion embodied these implausible
views, there would at least be an argument, for we know from Brown v.
Board of Education' 2 and Roe v. Wade, 33 for instance, that persuasive reasoning is not essential to watershed status in constitutional law.
Independent of any respectability acquired through a Weeks ancestry, the "evidentiary transaction," "unitary model" thesis has just
one virtue-it sounds like more than a mere assertion of belief in the
exclusionary rule. Even when supplemented by Professor Kamisar's varied contentions, the whole is little more persuasive than a sermon
preached to the choir. The unconverted have been given no reason to
mend their ways, and will (should) stay their course unless or until
Justice Day persuades them otherwise.
III.

UNDERSTANDING

Weeks

IN ITS OWN CONTEXT

Weeks talk is incurably infected by the exclusionary rule synthesis

in criminal procedure history. Because principles articulated, but not
originated, by Justice Day did, after considerable refraction and external aid from the truly seminal Boyd v. United States's4 case, eventuate
in the rule, Weeks itself is universally read as if it were talking about
and justifying the exclusionary rule. It did neither. That it did not do
so is at least suggested by the absence of any language in the opinion

denoting its outcome as "exclusion" or "suppression." Even Professor
Kamisar notes, although incorrectly, that the Weeks rule was not referred to as "exclusion" until 1943.35 It is correct that Weeks itself did
not employ that hallowed term. Further, even allowing for intergenerational definitional vagaries, Weeks contains no discussion of exclusion
under any nomenclature. There is effectively no mention of it either,
save as a foreseeable consequence of what was under investigation. In
Justice Day's words, the issue was "the right of the court in a criminal
prosecution to retain for the purposes of evidence""' unlawfully seized
papers of the accused, when the defendant had filed a timely, pretrial
petition for return.' Still more revealing is the opinion's distinction
and express approval of the exclusionist's bate noire-the ancient rule

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
116 U.S. 616 (1985).
Kamisar, supra note 23, at 590 n.162.
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
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of People v. Adams:13 8 " '[T]he court, when engaged in trying a criminal cause, will not take notice 'of the manner in which [a] wit[ness]
[has] possessed [himself] of [subjects of evidence] which are material
and properly offered in evidence.' "I" In fact, defense counsel even
cited Adams in support of Weeks' position."" Adams and Weeks were
inapposite, according to Justice Day, and the "ancient rule" survived
the case, allegedly establishing a "personal right to exclusion." The basis for Wigmore's vitriol, and for the case's celebrity among principled
defenders of exclusion, is therefore neither obvious nor simple.
Recovering the real Weeks, and assessing its lessons, is therefore a
subtle undertaking. Necessarily, one must resist the apparently ubiquitous temptation in constitutional law, evidenced by Kamisar, Justice
Brennan, and Professors Schrock and Welsh, to place retrieval of the
past in service of intervention in the present. Weeks may indeed tell us
as much, but we must read it, and not their commentary, to see what it
has to say. The starting point must be the facts of Weeks, which were
least conducive to exclusionary rule development.
A.

Weeks: The Facts

Fremont Weeks operated an interstate lottery racket out of Kansas
City, Missouri,"" which was rather successful, it would appear, from
the account given in the Supreme Court's opinion. Police officers seized
from Weeks' residence, in addition to "certain other property" they
were "unable to describe," a $500 bond, mining stock valued at
$12,000, and unvalued certificates issued by the San Domingo Mining
Loan and Investment Company.' 4 2 The officers also seized candies, a
tin box, a leather grip, and a "newspaper published about 1790, an
heirloom," all of whose evidential value was never explained.143 The
seizers were a comparably diverse group. An initial and evidently
larger search was conducted solely by the local constabulary. " ' Later,
they returned with a United States Marshal who personally searched
the defendant's room and "carried away certain letters and envelopes
found in the drawer of a chiffonier," or fancy dresser." 5 The take from
the earlier sweep was also turned over to federal agents, and eventually
all the items seized wound up under the control of the federal
prosecutor.

138. 176 N.Y. 351 (1903).
139. Id. at 358, quoted in Weeks, 232 U.S. at 395-96.
140. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 384.
141. Id. at 386. The factual account in the text is drawn exclusively from the
official report of the Weeks opinion.
142. Id. at 387.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 386.
145. Id.
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Mr. Weeks was arrested at work and without a warrant. More
importantly, each search was conducted with neither a warrant nor
valid consent, 1" and in the absence of emergency conditions, if not
probable cause. In any event, not even the United States Attorney contended that the seizures comported with fourth amendment requirements, and both the district court and the Supreme Court had little
difficulty concluding that the Constitution had been violated. Nevertheless, Weeks was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison
for mailing lottery paraphernalia. The evidence unlawfully taken from
his home was crucial to this result.
The fundamental error asserted was not the use of tainted evidence at trial, but rather the trial court's inadequate response to
Weeks' pretrial "Petition to Return Private Papers, Books and Other
Property."1 4 8 Set out fully in the text of the opinion, the motion prayed
for return of all the seized property then in federal hands.' 49 The moving papers imprecisely lumped into two piles a host of events and laws
that we would more fully distinguish. The two invasions and seizures,
subsequent receipt, ongoing retention by federal personnel, and contemplated use at trial were collectively and indiscriminately violative of the
fourth and fifth amendments as well as their Missouri counterparts.
Still, the single prayer for relief was return. 50 The trial court then cut
into this mass along an entirely new vector by ordering return of all
property not pertinent to the charge, without regard for its initial collection by state, as opposed to federal officers-a distinction the Supreme Court would not fail to make.' 51 The government promptly complied, and Weeks renewed his petition to return the remainder after the
jury had been sworn, and again when the evidence was actually introduced. The objection was based upon the fourth and fifth amendments
to the federal Constitution. Each effort being unsuccessful, the path
was cleared for Supreme Court review.
B.

The Remedial Basis of Weeks
"The defendant assigns error . . . in the court's refusal to grant

his petition for the return of his property and in permitting the papers
to be used at trial.' 52 So stated by Justice Day, this was the curtain
call of the defendant's undifferentiated, scatter-shot argument. Day immediately applied the scalpel and critically realigned the discussion
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 387.

149. Id. at 387-88.
150. Id. at 388.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 389.
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along two axes. "It is thus apparent that the question presented involves the

. . .

duty of the court with reference to the motion

. . .

for

the return of certain letters, as well as other papers, taken from his
room by the United States Marshal ....
153 Filtered out completely
were the depredations of the state police. Also removed from the analytical plan of the opinion was trial use of the evidence. That is, the
"exclusionary rule" was but a parasite attached as a known consequence to the pretrial return motion that was the real subject of dispute. From the Court's view, Weeks' petition was justifiably the center
of the controversy. For the return motion raised a contentious, practically momentous, analytically difficult, currently unresolved issue with
constitutional overtones. Divining the proper solution and adequately
justifying it was challenge enough for one opinion, and its resolution
alone, shorn of any exclusionary rule synthesis, was significant and
would have marked Weeks an important case, albeit not a landmark
one, in American criminal procedure. Put differently, had the exclusion
synthesis been short circuited, say by congressional action at the onset
of Prohibition, we would, or at least should, still remember Weeks.
That an "exclusion-less" Weeks was demonstrably significant also supports the view here expressed that Weeks was "exclusion-less." The
heated rhetoric of the opinion (much of it dictum in any event) so frequently quoted by Justice Brennan and others might seem hopelessly
misplaced if exclusion is not being justified after all. If not exclusion,
what is all the commotion about? It is instead about an important development in constitutionally grounded remedial law that did need a
boost from bombast. At the same time, given the context discussed below, the Weeks opinion is much too understated to support the breathtaking "personal right to exclusion" that Brennan, Kamisar, Schrock,
and Welsh find there and even say was consciously put there by Justice
Day. Only divine intervention could have explained that development.
In fact, Weeks is perhaps a barely overstated rationale for returning
illegally seized property, even if it has evidentiary value.
Since no one doubted the illegality of the marshal's acquisition,
resolution of the motion to return was all that needed attention. But
what looked like a simple replevin case could not be resolved by application of replevin principles. At common law, property with evidential
value could not be returned to its rightful owner, who need not be the
defendant, until the government was done with it.54 Moreover, pretrial
restoration of any property seized from a defendant was, before Weeks,
virtually unknown and its legal propriety very unsettled. The first such
153. Id.
154. See Grant, ConstitutionalBasis of the Rule Forbiddingthe Use of Illegally
Seized Evidence, 15 S. CAL. L. REV. 60 (1942).
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motion in American courts was made in 1908,155 and the application
was confidently denied because the seizure had been lawful. The court
in United States v. Wilson, 5 however, deeply questioned its authority
to entertain the motion at all. The court finally located jurisdiction in
"general principle," but not before convincing itself that the Adams
rule-"so well recognized that it cannot be the subject of much discussion"-was not in the way. 157 The general jurisdictional principle located was not the federal Constitution, but an inherent power to dispose of property in the court's control.158 In dictum, the Wilson opinion
made clear that in no event should evidential property be returned
before the trial concluded.
Perhaps expectedly, Weeks did not cite Wilson as authority for
pretrial return of evidence, but Justice Day did note everything else in
the field. He explicitly addressed the jurisdictional hurdle-the "right"
of the court to "deal" with papers and documents held by the District
Attorney and other officers subject to its authority.' 59 The Court
jumped astride a single case, Wise v. Henkel, 6 0 but that "right" was
not uneventfully established there, either. In Wise, the United States
Attorney in Manhattan was jailed for refusing to obey an order to return evidential property."" His petition revealed the magnitude of
countervailing forces: the district court was "without jurisdiction" to
issue the order, and the subsequent contempt order therefore violated
the Constitution. 62 Again in dictum, the Supreme Court remarked:
[i]t was within the power of the court to take jurisdiction of the
subject of the return and pass upon it as the result of its inherent
authority to consider and decide questions arising before it concerning an alleged unreasonable exertion of authority in connection with
the execution of the process of the court.16
The critical premise turns out to be that the property had been seized
pursuant to a warrant.
For the propriety of actually restoring "papers" wrongfully seized,
Justice Day cited the eminent Bishop on Criminal Procedure, who in
turn cited two 1835 English cases, Rex v. Kinsey 6 " and Rex v. Bar-

155.

(1921).
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Fraenkel, Concerning Search and Seizure, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 371

163 F. 338 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908).
Id. at 340.
Id. at 343-44.
232 U.S. at 398.
220 U.S. 556 (1911).
Id. at 557.
Id.
Id. at 558.
173 Eng. Rep. 198 (1836), cited in Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
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nett.'6 The Court double-dipped here by citing Kinsey and Barnett itself. Each compelled return of only nonevidential property. In addition,
Day relied upon United States v. McHie,' 66 a 1912 lower court ruling
that recognized jurisdiction to return, but that did not address the evidential versus nonevidential distinction. McHie also noted that the
common-law replevin action was technically unavailable in the Weeks
context. 67 Finally, the Weeks court cited United States v. Mills,'68 a
1911 circuit court case that did order return of books and papers which
were evidential, but not for the offense for which the defendant had
been indicted." 9 Also,
the Mills court noted its adherence to the pre7
vailing Adams rule.1 1
And that was all the Weeks court could muster. Justice Day found
no case from any court which held as he was about to hold-hence the
high-stakes, uncertain gamble of Weeks. The detriment to law enforcement was unmistakable. The Weeks litigation itself made it clear that
relief would necessarily mean reversal of the conviction. Genuine authority was scant, if any existed, and so the opinion needed assistance.
More important to our purpose is recognition of the underpinnings of
Weeks in the theory of the cases it cited. Jurisdiction in Henkel, Mills,
and McHie, for instance, stemmed from some general, inherent authority of courts over their processes and over property in their constructive
custody.' 7 ' As a matter of historical fact, each involved documentary
evidence unlawfully seized under color of judicial process-i.e., warrants-leading to deposit of the seized items with the court. Critically,
not a word was spoken of the Constitution in general, or the fourth
amendment in particular, in any of those cases. Justice Day, in his key
justificatory paragraph, added none. The Weeks "infrastructure" was
established without any reliance at all on constitutional analysis, only
on the nature and powers of courts. There is no intimation that the
fourth amendment in this pre-Bivens regime either required or justified
this exercise of judicial power.
The "superstructure" of Weeks, that the proper rule of law was
indeed restoration, necessarily participated in fourth amendment doctrine. If the initial seizure had been lawful, the Court had no duty to
perform. That it was unlawful was an essential premise, not of jurisdiction, but of the holding in Weeks: "[T]here was involved in the order
refusing the application a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused, and . . .the court should have restored these letters to the ac-

165.
166.
,167.
168.
169.

172 Eng. Rep. 563 (1829), cited in Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
194 F. 894 (N.D. Ill. 1912), cited in Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
Id. at 898.
185 F. 318 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), cited in Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
Id. at 320.
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Id.
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See supra text accompanying notes 160-70.
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cused." 17 1 In other words (and contra principled basis defenders), "return" and not exclusion was in some crucial sense constitutionally
required. That the "sense" is subtle is apparent by the absence of constitutional overtones in the infrastructure. Here is where the otherwise
misguided analogy to Marbury may help: "The very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.' 1 78 Fremont
Weeks was injured. What "protection" did the "laws" afford him, if
not return?
Very little. Or none. The government had already stripped him of
the first line of defense-the always risky and dangerous option of resisting unlawful entry at the doorstep,-because the police ransacked
his home while he was in custody. In general, very few citizens could be
counted upon to resist the usually overwhelming official display of
power and authority at the point of entry. Simple replevin, we have
seen, was unavailable. Weeks could have sued the marshal for trespassing, but only in state court where, then as now, juries were slow to take
money from police officers in order to compensate an apparent criminal.17 4 Besides, and especially when a warrant had issued, the officer
was protected by various defenses. The Weeks case also arose before
the All Writs Act, 175 which specifically provided for prosecution for
abuse of process, although time would reveal that it, too, was an illusory sanction. Even a money judgment was problematic. Collecting
from the marshal could be difficult,'17 and significantly, the federal
government could not be made a party. 7 7 Note that the doctrine of
respondeat superior had not found its way into fourth amendment law
even when the "unitary model" had supposedly been developed by the
Supreme Court. Thus, the "deepest pocket" was out of reach. Finally,
except (very arguably) for Boyd, "suppression" or "exclusion" had
never occurred in a reported case.
Weeks was thus practically without recourse, and the Marbury injunction lobbied for innovation. Because Weeks' position was typical of
persons aggrieved by unlawful federal police action, the general increase in federal law enforcement activity after 1900 further pressured
the Supreme Court. Most particularly, while the exponential leap of
Prohibition was at best predictable, ratification of the Income Tax
Amendment in 1913 surely portended a drastic expansion of coercive

172.
173.
174.
(1941).
175.
176.
177.

232 U.S. at 398.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 161.
Grant, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment, 14 S.CAL. L. REV. 359, 365
40 Stat. 217 (1917).
See Grant, supra note 174, at 359.
Grant, supra note 154, at 61.
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federal intrusion into daily life."7 8 It is thus quite true, in such a context, that "[ilf letters and private documents can thus be seized and
held and used in evidence,"' 179 fourth amendment. protection is of "no
'
value" and "might as well be stricken from the Constitution,"180
not
because some "personal right to exclusion" was somehow "in" the
amendment, but because Weeks was otherwise remediless. There was
involved "a denial of [Weeks'] constitutional rights" by the lower court
because he was denied an indispensable remedy. Yes, there were, as
principled basis writers contend, two "constitutional wrongs" in
Weeks-one by the marshal for unlawful seizure and one by the trial
court for ignoring the Marbury command. But exclusion is still omitted
from the list.
That Weeks articulated a constitutionally inspired remedy is variously demonstrable. First, it is literally a transplantation of the ordinary common-law remedy of replevin. Second, the cases cited by Justice Day were all rooted in the courts' inherent power to redress wrongs
committed within their purview. Third, Justice Day excluded state officers from Weeks' reach, stating, "[W]hat remedies the defendant
may have against them we need not inquire."'' Fourth, Weeks' insistence on a timely, pretrial motion turned the proceeding (as courts interpreting Weeks clearly saw) 8 2 into an independent civil action in
which the fourth amendment was the standard of care and restoration
the mandated relief. Fifth, prevailing rules of procedure precluded pretrial objection to the use of evidence' 8" so that the "timely application"
of Weeks could not be seen as a trial issue for exclusion, but for some
other remedial action. Sixth, and more inclusive, is the internal theoretical effect of the opinion's nonincorporationis! stand. It permits, though
it does not require, the holding to unfold within nonconstitutional
bounds. In this, Weeks and the frequently quoted Olmstead "judicial
integrity" dissents 84 are cognate-neither opinion was intended as constitutional law.
Related but different is the obvious absence of anything like the
"unitary model" Schrock and Welsh attribute to Weeks, which would
link restoration, but still not yet exclusion, more directly to the Constitution than Marbury. In other words, besides the positive evidence that
178. Between 1901 and 1932, for instance, the number of federal prosecutions
increased by a factor of five. Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal
Cases. Constitutionaland Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1441 (1984).
179. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 398 (emphasis added).
182. See infra notes 301-23 and accompanying text.
183. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
184. See supra text accompanying note 139.
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a remedy is afoot, is evidence negating any other theoretical basis.
There is, of course, no express attempt to link return to the constitutional text itself, nor effectively so via traditional interpretive aids like
historic intent. The extended praise in Weeks for the fourth amendment itself and for the social importance of its binding effect upon the
entire government has an identifiable function, but as we shall see, that
function is not to justify some unitary model/personal right to exclusion thesis. Adams remains the insuperable obstacle to personal rights
theorizing, considering its survival of Weeks and (more so) the almost
obsessive effort of Justice Day to affirm its validity and distinguish it
from the case before him. This fear of Adams also pervaded Wilson,
Mills, and McHie even as they affirmed jurisdiction to return. 185 Adams' deference was not, as Wigmore would have it, some inexcusable
failure to confess a break with the past' 8 but, quite the contrary, the
heart of Weeks' justificatory scheme. The logic was that, while the
fourth amendment could justify return, it could not by itself justify exclusion. The Weeks court, along with the others, was painfully aware
that its justificatory problems were aggravated, perhaps insurmountably, if the trial itself was swept within the analytical scheme. "General
principles not covered by the rules of evidence" nicely captures the
available freedom of action. The rules of evidence, that is, the "ancient
rule" admitting all competent material-was a qualitatively different,
exceedingly formidable barrier to further development of the remedial
scheme. Put differently, if the fourth amendment itself (in a strong,
more than Marbury sense) or a unitary model were propelling Weeks,
the rules of evidence could be trampled like an ant. That a subconstitutional remedial scheme was at work is clear from the diffidence with
which it approached the surely nonconstitutional rules of evidence.
Weeks' explicit retention of the "silver platter" doctrine, which permitted retention and use of evidence illegally seized by state officers, reinforces1 87 the relative modesty of the Weeks' theoretical base, as well as
the formidableness of trial. That a genuine constitutional command
would, and did, trample the rules of evidence is shown by the contemporaneous capacity of the fifth amendment to exclude, among other
things, evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment.
Why then did Justice Day spend pages in praise of the fourth
amendment, chastising aggressive law enforcement with a constitutional jeremiad? 188 If Weeks is a remedial and not a "personal rights"
case, why this ode to the framers? Specifically, what is the message in
the passage excerpted by Justice Brennan in Leon?1 89 Most of the tur185.
186.

See supra text accompanying notes 156-70.
Wigmore, supra note 3, at 43.

187. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
188. Id. at 392-94.
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104 S. Ct. at 3434 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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gid rhetoric can and should be accommodated by the Marbury duty
adequately to remedy constitutional violations. Not easily so cabined
are, for example, these admonitions:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country
to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures should find no
sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all
times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all
conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.19 °
The efforts of the courts and [federal] officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have19 resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. '
To sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision
a manifest neglect if not an open defiance of . . . the
Constitution.' 9 2
The Marbury influence lingers, but there is more here. That excess
is supplemented by Justice Day's lengthy recollection of the revered
Boyd opinion, 19 3 in which Justice Bradley paid such homage to the
fourth amendment's genesis that a neutral observer might mistake the
subject of discussion for the Sermon on the Mount. Granted that the
fourth amendment is a fundamental controlling norm and that police
officers (emphatically) must observe it, why the high pitch and stamping of feet in this case? Remember, no one doubted that the marshal
had violated the Constitution, and the hagiographic rendition of Justice
Bradley's opinion and of the framers is surely dictum, if not entirely
misplaced-misplaced, however, only until the hidden agenda of Weeks
is coaxed into the open. Think of it this way: because the amendment is
so important, courts are obliged (and not too reluctantly) to follow
Marbury and provide the appropriate remedy even if it hampers law
enforcement efforts, "praiseworthy as they are." Restoration is the appropriate remedy, and it shall be ordered regardless of the foreseeable
effect that, at least in theory, an entire prosecution might be mooted.
(Whether Weeks was retried without the tainted evidence, and if so,
convicted, is unknown). This is heady stuff, perhaps heroic, for it
clearly, if implicitly, takes a stand on the exclusionary rule dilemma.
Should the criminal go free when the constable blunders? Weeks answers a resounding yes.
190.
191.
192.

Id. (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392).
Id. (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392).
Id. (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394).
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No other case had done so. For the first time what we now take for
granted was effectively articulated-that the government (and of
course, derivatively, society) was punishable for an officer's misconduct.
Previously, as we have seen, tort judgments ran only against the blunderers and did not affect the availability of evidence in any way. That
is, to repeat, replevin had never before been ordered for property of
evidentiary value. 19 ' That Weeks did so hold is no doubt what ignited
Wigmore. This conclusive but implicit settlement of Cardozo's dilemma-that the proper remedial course would not be diverted by law
enforcement utility-is a necessary premise of the exclusionary rule.
The enormousness of the moment was not lost on Justice Day. All of
this may have been implicit, but it was not obscure, and his recognition
is detectable in the very structure of the opinion. Having treated his
readers to an orgiastic feast of fourth amendment values, he then slips
his properly intoxicated guests the bill-law enforcement will sometimes be sacrificed to save the Constitution.
There is no attempt in Weeks to gauge this "cost." It is enough to
remark that there was a cost to law enforcement and that it must be
paid. Nor is there any consideration of what we call deterrence. There
are peremptory observations that the fourth amendment must be
obeyed by police officers and courts, but nowhere are they connected up
with the propriety of restoring the property. Whether return would, or
would not, affect police behavior presumably can, like the personal
rights theories, be forced upon disparate passages from Weeks. In either case, those theories shall remain foreign to the opinion.
None of this should console principled basis defenders. The structural settlement is writ, not on a "personal rights" theory of replevin
(much less exclusion), but on the "adequate remedy" scheme they expressly disown. Conversely, the remedial account in Weeks is not that
hybrid now in vogue-that exclusion "remedies" fourth amendment violations generally through its deterrent effect. There is, in other words,
much more of the Hohfeldian jurisprude than the social scientist in
Justice Day. Still, the specter of empiricism, with the added gloss of
common-law reasoning, prevents the principled from rejoicing.
Whether return or exclusion is required by the Marbury injunction depends upon specifics of the extant remedial regime. Bivens and the application of respondeat superior principles to the government, among
other developments, differentiate the present climate from that of
Weeks. Thus "return" and, again, exclusion, may no longer be
necessary.
More important than the empirical threat is the devastating blow
struck by the remedial confinement of Weeks. While return might indeed be an appropriate remedy (and ordered notwithstanding exclu-

194.

See supra text accompanying notes 154-55.
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sionary effects), exclusion surely is not, and cannot be made to be. Exclusion is not a remedy at all, and Kamisar and others implicitly
concede it by rejecting ihis theory of Weeks. Return is appropriate because it has a common-law counterpart, replevin, which is perfectly
proportional-only what was illegally taken is restored to the rightful
owner whose peaceful possession was unjustifiably disturbed-and flows
directly from the wrongdoer or, if necessary, the present custodian, to
the aggrieved. Further, and as Weeks laboriously established, it does
minimal damage to surrounding external bodies of law like evidence,
criminal procedure, and separation of powers. In contrast, exclusion has
no antecedent, common-law or otherwise. It is not proportional, does
not aspire to be, and has no inherent capacity to develop the requisite
sense of balance. As Chief Justice Burger remarked in Bivens, exclusion amounts to "universal 'capital punishment.' "195 Further, while the
aggrieved party benefits from exclusion, often disproportionately so, the
wrongdoer suffers no personal diminution. Indeed, and clearly during
the Weeks era, an innocently bystanding, law-abiding society pays the
price of what in legal contemplation was the tortious act of a stranger.
In addition, while the jurisdictional issues presented by return were difficult, they were (with some chutzpah) honestly and respectably resolved in favor of the defendant. But finding inherent authority to return property when asked to in a remedial proceeding independent
from the criminal trial is (as Justice Day saw) one thing, exclusion (as
his distinction of Adams attests) is quite another. In short, one must
avoid overstating Weeks' significance, large as it was. Exclusion itself
was not justified under any theory proffered there, and the theory that
justified return was at most an alpha point in the subsequent development of the exclusionary rule.
The final and most important factor limiting Weeks' impact is the
unfortunate but evidently intentional neglect by the principled theorists
of the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause. The confluence of
the two amendments, so bitterly lamented by Wigmore, is abundantly
evident in Weeks. At all points, the defendant sought relief under both
the fourth and fifth amendments and their Missouri equivalents, and so
Justice Day restated Weeks' legal position."96 Indeed, the structure of
each side's presentation as recounted in the opinion, reflects a prevailing view: that introduction at trial of papers acquired in violation of the
fourth amendment offended the fifth amendment (and not the
fourth). 97 Even though Justice Day clearly identified Weeks as a
fourth amendment discussion, 198 he nevertheless intertwined the two
195.
U.S. 388,
196.
197.
198.

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
419 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 389.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 389.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:1031

great guarantees. His extended treatment of Boyd (which was actually
a fifth amendment case with lots of overheated dictum about the
fourth) and his supporting quotation from Bram v. United States'99 (an
involuntary confession case inexplicably neglected by fifth amendment
researchers) confirm the continuing conjunction. Moreover, the ellipsis
in the grand rhetorical flourish quoted by Justice Brennan left out only
the fifth amendment reference. 0 0 The Weeks original complained of
the "tendency" to secure convictions by "unlawful seizures and enforced confessions." '0 The principled basis commentators barely notice
this critical mutuality, and absolutely ignore its analytical significance.
A more complete account of this fateful entanglement, instigated by
Boyd, carried by Weeks, and not conclusively separated until 1966 by
Schmerber v. California,0 2 is found in Part IV of this Article. For
now, three critical effects may be observed:
1) Most theoretically, the fifth amendment's preemptive power
was understood as a clear textual command directed to judges regarding their trial duty. By inference, the absence of a similar understanding of the fourth amendment cuts deeply into the purely interpretive
justification for a "personal right to exclusion." No "unitary model"
here-just deference to the straightforward direction of the text.
2) The yeoman's work done by the self-incrimination clause eliminated any judicial incentive to develop a fourth amendment exclusionary rule, at least in the pre-Prohibition Weeks environment where it
appears that the confiscated property was usually documentary evidence. As noncontraband, it could be returned; as writings they were
susceptible to fifth amendment analysis.
3) The "cost" paid in returning Fremont Weeks' purloined letters
was greatly diminished, since the fifth amendment may have barred
their use at trial anyway. We will never know what Justice Day intended, if anything, for the trial objection itself. Return rendered the
evidence unavailable, and thus, there could be no offer to prompt an
objection. At a minimum, we should affix an asterisk to the Weeks set-

199. 168 U.S. 532 (1897), cited in Weeks, 232 US. at 391. Justice Day quoted
from the following passage in Bram:
[lit was in that case demonstrated that both of these Amendments con-

templated perpetuating, in their full efficacy, by means of a constitutional
provision, principles of humanity and civil liberty, which had been secured
in the mother country only after years of struggle, so as to implant them in
our institutions in the fullness of their integrity, free from the possibilities of

future legislative change.
168 U.S. at 544.
200. See Leon, 104 S. Ct. at 3434 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Weeks, 232
U.S. at 392).
201. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392.
202. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood sample taken without consent to determine
whether petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the accident).
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tlement and reduce its encomium to "almost heroic." Put differently,
the total bill was never presented to the Weeks Court, and only educated surmise can now reckon that Court's response.
Weeks' debt to the fifth amendment is difficult to overstate. Consider again that all the federal cases relied upon by Justice Day-with
the exception of Bram, which was most clearly a confession
case-involved the unlawful seizure of documentary evidence and
"merely" so. That is, Boyd, Adams, McHie, Mills, Henkel, and Weeks
were classic fifth amendment exclusion cases. "Mere" evidence, at that
juncture, was never subject to a lawful seizure. In addition, they
seemed to the judicial mind just the kind of self-incriminatory activities
the fifth amendment detested. It was only when later events such as the
large-scale seizure of nonreturnable contraband liquor during Prohibition drove a wedge between the two amendments that the exclusionary
rule began to collect in the mists of history.

IV.

EXCLUSION AFTER

Weeks

Surveying the mushroomed search and seizure corpus as the second World War commenced, Professor Grant reported that the exclusionary rule was a "liberalization" of Weeks,20 3 and my survey of that
same decisional opus (and up to the 1949 decision in Wolf v. Colorado)20 " warrants concurrence. But one must insist with Grant that it
was the Weeks return remedy that was liberated2 0 5 and not from its
Marbury theoretical home. Return became suppression, but suppression remained a remedy. My concurring opinion must further insist,
again for the most part with Grant, that Weeks boosted exclusion by its
transmission from Boyd to beyond of the fifth amendment exclusionary
thesis. Indeed, even as the Supreme Court talked of suppression as deterrence in Wolf,20 6 it transmitted fifth amendment influences all the
way to 1966 when Schmerber v. California07 conclusively separated
exclusion from self-incrimination. Most importantly, careful inspection
of all the pre- Wolf cases, and of a substantial portion of the immediate
post-Weeks state decisions, provides literally no support for a personal
right to exclusion, based either in Weeks or on a "unitary" reading of
the fourth amendment. Here, one can neither confirm nor deny a
Grantism, because those principled bases of exclusion never occurred to
him or to anyone else in the era reviewed. Looking for confirmation of
the personal rights thesis before Wolf is thus about as satisfying as
waiting for Godot. Professor Kamisar concedes almost as much by re-
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marking (inaccurately) that
the rationale of exclusion was unattended
20 8
between Weeks and Wolf
Wolf concludes this survey because, according to principled exponents, it is the seminal heretic, the demonic cult figure, that introduced
a deterrence rational at war with the original understanding of the rule
in Weeks. Part III of this Article demonstrated that Weeks does not
bear the understanding so attributed (although Weeks may be a virtual
stranger to Wolf too). The following examination of the interim decisions explicates a further, equally dangerous deficiency in the principled project-there was no "original understanding" of the exclusionary rule. Rather, there was an abundance of justifications in the
formative post-Weeks period. The fifth amendment served throughout,
although to varying extents, as the fourth amendment's exclusionary
rule. The Weeks remedial scheme remained an important thrust, but as
"return" transmitted into "suppression" (an evolutionary process outlined below), courts increasingly departed from the "original"
Hohfeldian conception of it precisely because exclusion appeared less
and less like an equitable means of compensating aggrieved individuals.
In other words, as it became clearer that exclusion, and not return,
needed justifying (when, for example, contraband was involved), Weeks
became less relevant. Put still differently, just as the rule became one
of "exclusion," a plurality of rationales developed to fill the void left by
Weeks' irrelevance. Tacitly (and sometimes expressly) conceding that
more than Weeks was necessary, courts developed all the familiar rationales: judicial integrity, general deterrence of police misconduct,
punishment or "sanction" of individual offending officers, and variously
accentuated uses of the term "remedy."'" Conspiciously, all the cases
treated exclusion as a derivative issue and not part of the fourth
amendment itself. Thus the ultimate denial of Weeks as "personal
rights" innovator: no one in an entire succeeding generation of jurists
who painstakingly read and applied that case found the principled basis
assertedly heralded there.
For heuristic purposes, discussion of the cases is divided by first
isolating the Supreme Court and then examining lower court opinions
in two blocks balanced upon the contentious 1928 Olmstead v. United
States decision.2 10 For reasons of obvious authority, the Supreme Court
warrants separate treatment, and the reasons for the Olmstead fulcrum
are apparent in the discussion. As with form of organization, order is
thereby exaggerated. There was in fact, for example, a great upward
movement of ideas, as Supreme Court pronouncements were frequently
208. Kamisar, supra note 23, at 601.
209. The support for these propositions is in the negative. The authors and Justice Brennan made no effort to place their thesis in post-Weeks/pre- Wolf case law.
210. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
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previewed in the lower courts. Also, the general decisional trends described below obscure the stray case either before or after its time or
simply contrary to the weight of authority. On one point, however,
there are no caveats-there are no unitary model cases and no cases
explicating a personal constitutional right to exclusion.
A.

The Search for Weeks, I The Supreme Court and Exclusion,
1885-1949
In the beginning was Boyd v. United States,21 ' and its kerygmatic

opinion possessed both the tone and effect of a Delphic pronouncement.
While tightly packed with rhetorical gunpowder and evocations of
great (long dead) civil libertarians, Boyd was unfortunately guilty of
neither clarity nor analytical sophistication. There was a judicial order,
effectively (as the concurring Justices understood), a subpoena duces
tecum, issued upon statutory authorization at the United States Attorney's request, requiring the claimant of forfeited goods to produce his
books and invoices. 1 Failure to produce was, according to the statute,
proof that the prosecutor's allegations were confessed.213 Understandably, Boyd (like Weeks) was not conducive to exclusionary rule development. The constable not only had not blundered, he had done nothing
at all, and controversy circulated exclusively about judicial conduct
pursuant to statute. In the event, the claimant obeyed the order and
produced the invoices under protest and further objected to their introduction at trial. As recounted by Justice Bradley, the objection was
that "no evidence can be compelled from the claimants themselves, and
also that the statute, so far as it compels production of evidence to be
used against the claimants is unconstitutional and void.

' 21"

Later,

Bradley reported a contention that the enabling statute contravened
both the fourth and fifth amendments." 5 The Solicitor General sensibly
replied that, at most, the statute was tantamount to compulsory production and that search and seizure were not involved. "That is so,"
replied Justice Bradley, but he continued:
It is true that certain aggravating incidents of actual search and
seizure, such as forcible entry into a man's house and searching
amongst his papers, are wanting, .

.

. but it [the statute] accom-

plishes the substantial object of those [prior] acts [which had authorized search and seizure] in forcing from a party evidence against
himself. It is our opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of
a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge against him
.211. 116 U.S. 616 (1885).
212. Id. at 617.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 621-22.

215. Id. at 630.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 30:1031

• . . is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, in all cases in which a search and seizure would be; because it
is a material ingredient,
and effects the sole object and purpose of
2 16
search and seizure.
The symbiosis established between the two amendments was breathtaking and keenly felt by Justice Bradley. The "intimate relation" between the amendments permitted them to "throw great light on each
other.1 2 17 Indeed, the amendments "run almost into each other. ' 18
Rather, the Court shoved them together, but the effect was the same
and disposed of the second issue stated by Bradley-was the proceeding an "unreasonable" search and seizure? It was, principally because
the result was compulsory self-incrimination. According to the Boyd
Court, "[bireaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers"-that
is, actual search and seizure-were only "circumstances of aggravation"; the encompassing sacred right of "personal security, personal liberty and private property" produced the fourth amendment's condemnation.2 19 That sacred right engendered the fifth amendment as well, so
that the amendments' collision, had it been fatal, would have been
fratricide.
The Boyd Court further confused this mutuality by adding to the
affinity of consanguinity what sounds like the "evidentiary transaction"
immortalized by Schrock and Welsh. Why do the two guarantees shed
mutual illumination?
For the "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the
Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal
cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man
"in a criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to
what is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. And we have been unable to perceive that
the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to
be a witness against himself. We think it is within the clear intent
and meaning of those terms. 2 °
Sounding much more directly supportive than anything in Weeks,
it is still easy to see why the passage is of no value to principled basis
theorists. The fifth amendment is a necessary ingredient in the exclusionary recipe. The evidentiary transaction is climaxed by the trial ap216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
Id. at 633.
Id. at 630.

Id.
Id. at 633.
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pearance of the self-incrimination clause. Indeed, the fourth is assigned
the supporting role in that the "unreasonableness" is largely a function
of self-incrimination. Consequently, a fourth amendment violation was,
a fortiori, self-incrimination, and thus, the fifth amendment's trial prohibition was called into play.
Later in the opinion, Justice Bradley explicated what had been implicit-the fifth amendment was both a necessary and sufficient ground
for reversal, while the fourth amendment was neither (as the concurring Justices pointed out).2 21 Most important, one can now see how
Boyd could be read for the proposition that evidence seized in violation
of the fourth amendment is inadmissible without being authority for
the exclusionary rule.
Only the' exclusionists' great nemesis-Adams v. New
York 2 2-stands between Boyd and Weeks, and there is much more to
it than simple confirmation of the "ancient rule." Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Day assumed the relevance of the fourth and fifth
amendments to the state proceeding reviewed. Objection at trial was
directed at certain private papers tending to show that the defendant
knowingly possessed policy slips. Presumably, they were not subject to
lawful seizure, especially when, as in Adams, the warrant authorized
seizure only of the gambling paraphernalia itself. 2 3 Nevertheless, the
Court evidently assumed illegality since it squeezed the entire controversy into the ancient rule: if the papers were competent evidence,
could there be any constitutional impediment to admission? 2 4 There
was none. If competent, they were admissible on the authority of the
(copiously excerpted) cases applying the ancient rule. Of Boyd, Justice
Day unenthusiastically observed that it had been "frequently cited" '2' by
25
the Court and foreswore any "wish to detract from its authority,
sounding much like presidential candidate Nixon who travelled to the
Bible-belt to inform his audience that he would not discuss John Kennedy's Catholicism. The Adams Court (containing several members of
the Weeks Court) 226 thought Boyd distinguishable because no judicial
process issued for Adams' papers, thereby freeing the judiciary of complicity in prohibited fourth amendment behavior.227 The Court in Adams thus implicitly rejected the evidentiary transaction analysis. The
fourth amendment was violated by unlawful "invasion" of the home,
and the security intended included a duty to "give remedy against such
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 637.
192 U.S. 585 (1904).
Id. at 594.
Id. at 588.
Id. at 597.
The common members were Justices Day, Holmes, White, and McKenna.

227.

192 U.S. at 598.
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usurpations when attempted. 228 But "the English and nearly all of the
American cases have declined to extend this [remedial] doctrine to the
extent of excluding testimony which has been obtained by such [illegal]
means, if it is otherwise competent. 2 9 According to Adams, Boyd was
an American exclusionist case because there the law "virtually compelled the defendant to furnish testimony against himself" and ran
counter to the fourth and fifth amendments. 30 Then, in what must
have been music to Wigmore's ears, Adams cut into Boyds' extravagance: the fifth amendment was "designed to protect against compul23 1
sory testimony from a defendant against himself in a criminal trial."
The incision did not take, for along with the remedial theory of
Adams (if not its precise calculation), Weeks transmitted the fifth
amendment conflation of Boyd to the Prohibition era. For now one
need only further appreciate the inertial forces working upon
Weeks-the fifth amendment might exclude evidence, but the fourth
could not and should not. Courts must avoid effecting unreasonable
searches and seizures as, for instance, in Boyd, and they must remedy
the "usurpations" of others. Thus, it is fairly evident that a "personal
right to exclusion" thesis marked a breathtaking theoretical discovery.
There is no evidence of such a find in Weeks, and jurists, including
Supreme Court Justices, assiduously reading Weeks detected no such
evidence.
The stream of continuity from Boyd and Adams through Weeks is
amply verified in the case that uniquely contributed to its ultimate diversion into a simple rule of fourth amendment exclusion. The case is
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,3 and it, at least as much
as Weeks, was identified in succeeding cases with the exclusionary precept. In all accounts (including those asserting the primacy of Weeks),
Justice Holmes' brief opinion is an essential reference. The famous passage refused the government's attempt to use tainted evidence, lest the
fourth amendment be reduced to a "form of words."2 33 Further, "[t]he
essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain
way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the
Court but that it shall not be used at all."' 3 '
Sounds good. Maybe even sounds like the exclusionary rule is
somehow woven into the Constitution itself. But that would assume
that the noisemaker is the fourth amendment itself, as opposed to, for
example, Weeks. The underlying constitutional violation was just the
228. Id.
229. Id.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
Id.
251 U.S. 385 (1920).
Id. at 392.
Id.
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same as in Weeks: after arresting the defendants, federal officers went
to their place of business and swept it clean of all books and papers."
A prompt motion for return ensued, and eventually the district court
ordered the documents returned, but not before the prosecutors copied
them.2 36 The District Attorney then served the defendants with a subpoena for the originals he had just returned, 37 apparently because the
court had impounded the reproductions. Appeal was ultimately taken
from the contempt citation for disobeying the court's compliance order,
which issued despite a finding of unconstitutionality in the initial
seizure.
"The proposition could not be presented more nakedly," Justice
Holmes announced.2 38 "The Government now, while in form repudiating and condemning the illegal seizure, seeks to maintain its right to
avail itself of the knowledge obtained by that means which otherwise it
would not have had."28 9 Properly distilled, the government would reduce the Constitution's protection to "physical possession"-that is, the
defendants may physically regain the papers-"but not any advantages" acquired by the illegality.24 0 Weeks, "to be sure," meant that
laying the papers before the grand jury was "unwarranted," but "it is
taken [by the government] to mean only that two steps are required
instead of one. '24 Here the obscurity of Silverthorne gives way: the
government would circumvent Weeks, and (because Weeks is traceable
via Marbury to the fourth amendment) the Constitution as well.
Holmes correctly saw that Weeks was meaningless if not fortified by
Silverthorne and that, without shoring up Weeks, the Marbury duty
was endangered. Holmes' opinion can and should be read as it was basically intended: a perfection, and not a remodeling, of the Weeks remedy and especially not a theoretical reworking of Weeks' fourth amendment theory. There is ample evidence that such was the design. First,
Adams is addressed and distinguished, not overruled. 2 Second, the
chief supporting case cited by Holmes-Flagg v. United States' 4,-is
best understood as an instance of Marbury analysis: like Silverthorne,
a quest for the adequate remedy. Third, Holmes adopts as a premise of
Silverthorne the fragmentary model. The marshall's blunders could not
be considered "the wrongful act of a stranger," as they ordinarily
would be in fourth amendment contemplation, because the District At235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 390.
Id. at 390-91.
Id.at 391.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 391-92.

242. 251 U.S. at 392.
243.

233 F. 481 (2d Cir. 1916).
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torney had lent color to them by arming the officers with an invalid
subpoena."' Thus, the "Government" was a party to wrongdoing. The
district court also soiled its hands by improperly remedying this usurpation. Fourth, the constitutional temper of the opinion is muted by the
articulation of the independent source exception to (what was sounding
like, in Holmes' hands) the exclusionary rule.
Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become
sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in
the way proposed. 2 "
This sounds more like the nonconstitutional, "clean hands" rationale of
the Olmstead dissenters (Holmes, by the way, among them). Fifth, the
opinion never fully escapes the fifth amendment. Granted, Holmes denotes it a fourth amendment case, presumably because the corporate
defendant could not invoke the self-incrimination privilege. Still, there
was no doubt (from Boyd to Weeks to the soon to follow cases) that the
United States enjoyed a "windfall" in Silverthorne because the fifth
amendment would have protected noncorporate defendants in the same
circumstances. Justice Holmes thus understandably showed signs of a
visceral desire to read this fourth amendment case broadly enough to
achieve parity in the unavailability of investigative techniques whether
the subject was a natural person or one articifially created by state
corporation law.
That the self-incrimination clause remained the lodestar of exclusion was graphically depicted to the Court by the Attorney General in
Silverthorne, who asserted that all the post-Weeks cases (save one) 2 6
were explainable as fifth amendment cases. 247 This self-incrimination
ascendancy was definitely confirmed one year later by an identical, and
unanimous, Supreme Court. Gouled v. United States4" conclusively effected the transformation, underway for years, of the amendments as
seamless partnership per Boyd, into a 'elay team anchored by self-incrimination. The black-letter rule of Gouled was traceable to, but still
toned differently from, Boyd. Now, evidence seized in violation of the
fourth amendment was rendered inadmissible by the fifth. When evidence is illegally acquired from the accused, he is an "unwilling
source" and, in legal contemplation, compelled to be a witness against

244. Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 391.
245.

Id. at 392.

246. The exception was In re Tri-State Coal & Coke Co., 253 F. 605 (W.D. Pa.
1918) (exception made for another corporate defendant was clearly within a remedial
orbit).
247. Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 386-87 (citations omitted).
248. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
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himself.249 Gouled is justly remembered for its incorporation of the
"mere evidence" rule into fourth amendment jurisprudence; that is, papers solely of evidential value cannot be lawfully seized. 250 Unnoticed
was the diminution so accomplished. Because the fourth amendment
was always offended by documentary seizures, the fifth was allowed to
move on down the analytical line. Self-incrimination might comfortably
be relieved of acquisition vigilance and thus more completely attend to
the trial. Conversely, the clarity of Gouled's "if, then" syllogism was
conducive to a trial eclipse of the fourth amendment. Indeed, the two
guarantees were placed on a perfectly balanced see-saw. As the selfincrimination protection expanded (for instance, from documents to all
tangible evidence), the search and seizure guarantee was, proportionately, a trial -superfluity. Or as the stock in Wigmore's fifth amendment-limited to actual trial testimony-went up, the exclusionary
rule gained prominence.
The initial displacement of the fourth amendment and Weeks as
the locus of exclusion can be traced through the Supreme Court's gradual devaluation of Weeks' procedural requisites, a development already
underway in lower federal courts.25 In Gouled, for example, the trial
court denied return and later refused to entertain an objection based
upon the illegal seizure, thus following the ancient procedure that
courts will not stop a trial to inquire into the collateral issue of illegal
acquisition.2 51 In other words, the judge applied Adams. But where Adams had intimidated the Weeks Court, the Gouled Justices did not
flinch: only "[a] rule of practice," it "must not be allowed for any technical reason to prevail over a constitutional right." 3 Similarly, in
Gouled's companion case, Amos v. United States,254 the return petition
was delayed until after trial commenced (in violation of Weeks), and
the succeeding trial objection was overruled on the strength of Adams.2 M The Supreme Court, citing Gouled, found error on each

count. 56

That the crystallization of self-incrimination as excluder explains
the deflation of Adams was emphasized four years later in Agnello v.
United States.25 7 By then it was "well settled that, when properly invoked, the Fifth Amendment protects every person from incrimination
by the use of evidence obtained through search or seizure made in vio-

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 306.
Id. at 310.
See infra notes 345-50 and accompanying text.
255 U.S. at 304-05.
Id. at 313.
255 U.S. 313 (1921).
Id. at 316.
Id.

257.

269 U.S. 20 (1925).
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lation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment,"25" for which the
Court string cited Boyd, Weeks, Silverthorne, Gouled, and Amos. " 9
Revealingly, Frank Agnello never made a return request; rather he
sought exclusion at the time of the government's offer.2 60 A unanimous
Court, by now precisely the same as that which two years hence would
produce the fractious Olmstead decision, opined:
Where, by uncontracted facts, it appears that a search and seizure
were made in violation of the Fourth Amendment, there is no reason
why one whose rights have been so violated and who is sought to be
incriminated by evidence so obtained, may not invoke protection of
the Fifth Amendment immediately and without any application for
-the return of the thing seized. "A rule of practice must not be allowed for any technical reason to prevail over a constitutional
right.""6 1
Barely implicit is the suggestion that "return" was a non-fifth-amendment, constitutionally inferior, remedial procedure.
The fifth amendment's role assignment as the fourth amendment's
exclusionary sanction was regularly cited by the Supreme Court up to
and beyond Wolf. A sampling would begin with the 1927 decision in
Marron v. United States262 and would perhaps climax in the 1946 observation of Justice Frankfurter, who authored Wolf just three years
later: "Unjustified search and seizure violates the Fourth Amendment
... "28 Furthermore, "use, in any criminal proceeding, of the contents of the papers so examined . . . constitutes a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. '" 4 But clear Gouled-like statements like these were relatively rare after 1930 and were confined, as was Frankfurter's, to documents cases. The fifth amendment's function was more accurately portrayed in 1946 in Zap v. United States 2"8-"the law of searches and
seizures as revealed in the decisions of this Court is the product of the
interplay of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments."26 6 Most important,
the supremacy crowned by Marron was short-lived, for after Olmstead,
things were never again so tranquil. Sure, Silverthorne had deflected
consensus by alluding to a fourth amendment ban on "use" of tainted
documents, but Gouled restored relative calm. And Prohibition-era in258. Id. at 33-34.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 29.
261. Id. at 34-35 (quoting Gouled, 255 U.S. at 313).
262. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
263. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 608-09 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 477-78 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
264. Id.
265. 328 U.S. 624 (1946) (use of wiretapped conversation in evidence did not
violate defendant's fifth amendment right).
266. Id. at 628.
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ferior courts were already finding that return was impractical when
most illegally seized property was contraband liquor. So they reached
suppression via the remedial route of Weeks. But the Supreme Court,
even though it encountered contraband in Agnello (cocaine), Amos,
and Marron (liquor), had yet to label exclusion a product of the unaided fourth amendment. By the 1940's, however, not only was exclusion attributed to Weeks (and to a much lesser degree, Silverthorne)
without any mention of prior return, exclusion and Weeks were linked
to the fourth amendment by a fistful of rationales, with the Hohfeldian
remedial account notably in the background. More noticeably invisible
though was any suggestion that exclusion was a personal right of the
accused. This potpourri justification, detailed below, was invited by the
remarkable collection of opinions in Olmstead.
Olmstead is most recollected in exclusionary rule history for Justice Brandeis' "judicial integrity" dissent. Lost is the fact that Brandeis
did not offer the "clean hands" doctrine as constitutional analysis. Instead, he, along with every other member of the Olmstead Court who
addressed the constitutional status of exclusion, agreed that what was
seized in violation of the fourth amendment was excludable by the
fifth. 6 7 Chief Justice Taft, however, writing for a five member majority, was at first more coy: "There is no room in the present case for
applying the Fifth Amendment unless the Fourth Amendment was first
violated."' 26 8 Taft reasoned that because the telephone conversations intercepted were in no way coerced, only the fourth amendment potentially applied to the acquisition. 69 Then, before concluding that wiretapping was not fourth amendment activity, the Chief Justice (in what
was thus dictum) assessed the entire Boyd-Weeks line of cases.27 0 With
neither reticence nor apology, he concluded that in Gouled admission
had been a fourth amendment violation, 271 a judgment he extended to
the narcotics in Agnello (at least he mentioned the fifth amendment
there),2 2 and he insinuated that admission of the whiskey in Amos violated the fourth amendment alone.273 More remarkably, Weeks and
progeny now stood for "the sweeping declaration that the Fourth
Amendment, although not referring to or limiting the use of evidence
in courts, really forbade its introduction." 2 7'
The only reason proffered for the ancient rule's murder by the

267. 277 U.S. at 462 (Taft, C.J., writing for the majority); id. at 469 (Holmes,
J., dissenting); id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); id. at 486 (Butler, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 462.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 458-67.
271. Id. at 462.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 461.
274. Id. at 462.
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fourth amendment-other than Weeks-was fear that otherwise that
guarantee "would be much impaired.1 275 Taft left clues that some type
of remedial progression extended from Adams to Olmstead through
Weeks, but no more than that. This was a wafer-thin justification for
an original (at least in Supreme Court annals) and far-reaching proposition. There was really nothing but Weeks and its disciples, and they
simply had not produced, much less rationalized, a fourth amendment
exclusionary rule.
Little wonder then that after Olmstead, the doctrinal discipline of
Weeks and Gouled gave way. The Court had created an exclusionary
rule without a return address. As frequently is the case, some treated
the messenger as the origin of the news, and Olmstead became a source
of rationales. First, the Supreme Court consistently followed Chief Justice Taft in attributing the rule to Weeks. Even when the fifth amendment was mentioned in this connection, Weeks (and sometimes with
Boyd) was still cited as authority. Second, Justice Taft's unhelpful,
even cautious, generalization gained respectability. In 1948, Justice
Reed repeated it verbatim, saying that use of tainted evidence "would
impair the protection" of the fourth amendment.1 76 There were a lot of
minor variations on this undifferentiated rationale, too. Some opinions
made exclusion instrumentally valuable in that it somehow serviced
that privacy ensconced in the Constitution. United States v. Wallace &
Tiernan Co. 2 7 7 for example, decided in the Wolf Term, opined that exclusion was "designed to safeguard the privacy of people, and to prevent" unlawful seizures, lest the fourth amendment be reduced to "'a
form of words.' ",278 The majority in Goldstein v. United States 7 9 cited
Weeks for exclusion, reasoning that "otherwise the policy and purpose
of the Amendment might be thwarted.1 28 The deterrence connotations
here were drawn out a bit by Justice Frankfurter in 1947 in Harris v.
United States:2 81 exclusion deterred the tendency of police to disregard
constitutional constraints. 82 One year earlier he was more explicit: the
issue in Davis v. United States288 was civil liberty and its protection
against future inroads. 8"
The imprecision level increased dramatically when those other
275. Id. at 463.
276. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410, 425 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting).
277. 336 U.S. 793 (1949).
278. Id. at 798-99.
279, 316 U.S. 114 (1942).
280. Id. at 120.
281. 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,dissenting).
282. Id. at 172.
283. 328 U.S. 582 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Here Frankfurter referred to the exclusionary sanction as well as to the general fourth and fifth amendment issues presented in Davis.
284. Id. at 594.
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than Frankfurter spoke. Justice Murphy, for instance, determined that
exclusion was "indispensable" to the amendment's purpose "to protect
the citizen against oppressive tactics." '8 5 The Wallace Court described
it as an extraordinary sanction, imposed by the court to limit searches
to those conducted in compliance with the Constitution and thus
"stem[med] from the Fourth Amendment."2 86 In 1948, the Court reasoned that "the law provides as a sanction against the flouting of this
constitutional safeguard the suppression of evidence," 2 8 citing Weeks.
Whether "sanction" was a synonym for deterrence, or denoted a just
punishment for illegal behavior, or a compensatory individual remedy,
or a combination of all these, was unexplored. On another occasion,
Justice Murphy.wed sanction to the nonconstitutional judicial integrity
rationale of Brandeis' Olmstead dissent. In the Weeks line of cases, the
Court "refused to make itself a participant in lawless conduct by sanctioning the use in open court"2 88 of tainted evidence. A variation of this
"clean hands" doctrine appeared in the 1946 Zap v. United States
opinion. 289 As Weeks was explained in Silverthorne, "evidence so obtained is suppressed on the theory that the Government may not profit
from its own wrongdoing. '290 That the theoretical fuel of these concerns was neither a "unitary model" nor the Constitution, in some
other unmediated sense, was apparent in the better known case of McNabb v. United States,29 ' in which the the Court boldly stated that
rules of admissibility were at least partly derived from "a decent regard
for the 92duty of courts as agencies of justice and custodians of
2
liberty. 1
The boldest pre-Wolf statement was that of Justice Rutledge. In
Maliniski v. United States,2 93 he announced in a lone dissent that "the
Constitution does not tolerate the use of evidence obtained by unconstitutional methods." 29 " Maliniski, however, was a confession case, and
Rutledge cited only two cases for this Olympian pronouncement: Boyd
and Weeks. Thus, the fifth amendment continued to influence the Justices' exclusionary rule war of rationales.
The problem is readily apparent. By Wolfs eve, the whole parade
of rationales had passed by, and there was Supreme Court authority
285. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 142 (1942)
dissenting).
286. 336 U.S. at 798.
287. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948).
288. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 128 (1942)
dissenting).
289. 328 U.S. 624 (1946).

290. Id. at 630.
291.
292.
293.
294.

318 U.S. 332 (1943).
Id. at 347 (Reed, J., dissenting).
324 U.S. 401 (1945).
Id. at 423 (Rutledge, J.,dissenting).
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for practically every one of them. Most remarkably, all the while the
Justices cast about for a persuasive rendering of exclusion, they consistently ascribed both the rule itself and their account of it to Weeks.
Absent from the post-Olmstead opinions (though it reappeared, at least
ostensibly, in Wolf) was the pure remedial basis of Weeks, with Justice
Rutledge's words as the nearest approximation to a personal right to
exclusion. In truth, the Supreme Court's "original understanding" of
the exclusionary rule is a lot like Oakland: there is no there, there. The
rationale extravaganza of the 1940's as well as the rule itself, were all
said to be in Weeks. What was in Weeks, the remedial duty, was left
out of the festivities.
B.

The Search for Weeks, II: Inferior Courts 1914-1928

The appropriate metaphor for fourth amendment jurisprudence at
the time of Weeks is that of a turn-of-the-century, small, rural (probably Southern) town on a murderously hot August afternoon, where the
humidity of the climate is matched only by the torpor of the inhabitants, a place where change is measured by decades, if not by generations. In such steamy environs, only urgent problems of an elemental
nature are addressed, and they are resolved with minimal exertion,
both physical and mental. The United States Supreme Court would
feel at home there. First, there was Boyd, twenty years later Adams,
and Weeks, a decade after that. This sleepy existence was, at most,
perceptibly disturbed by Justice Day's remedial novelty, and the slumber continued until the onslaught of search and seizure litigation
billboarded the remarkably unsophisticated state of fourth amendment
law. Illustrative were some of the Weeks progeny. In one state supreme
court case, the testimony of trespassing officers about observations
made during their trespass was excluded as an "illegal confession"--of
the defendant!295 In Haywood v. United States2 96 the court denied a
motion to suppress documentary evidence (there, the "subversive" literature of the I.W.W. or "Wobblies," a labor organization) on the theory
that, like stolen items and smuggled goods, such "outlaw property"
could never be illegally seized.297 In another federal case, evidence obtained by searching an automobile was admitted as lawfully incident to
the "arrest" of the car.29 8 The uncertain grasp on fundamentals exemplified by these courts was hardly condemnable. After all, Boyd was
barely less confused, and the Supreme Court had done little in Adams
and Weeks to put its theoretical house in order. The point is that, overall and including the Supreme Court (as the previous. section made

295.
296.
297.
298.

Tucker v. State, 90 So. 845, 847 (Miss. 1922).
268 F. 795 (7th Cir. 1920).
Id. at 803.
United States v. Rembert, 284 F. 996, 998-99 (S.D. Tex. 1922).
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painfully clear), search and seizure law was cobbled together in Weeks
and its successors from a variety of diverse, preexisting sources. Prominent in this recipe were the amalgamated fourth and fifth amendments.
Added to the brew were a host of common-law search doctrines like the
search incident affirmation of Weeks, as well as Justice Day's borrowing of the familiar replevin remedy. A third: the "mere evidence" rule
of Gouled. A fourth example was the Olmstead insistence that "persons, hours, papers, and effects" were to be taken literally as terms of
limitation, and finally, the "ancient rule itself." Most important is the
implicit realization that, while the constitutional doctrines of search
and seizure were coming fast and furiously, there was little, if any,
theoretical reflection, much less invention, going on. This much is apparent as late as the 1960's, when, in addition to Schmerber's disentanglement efforts, Warden v. Hayden2 99 finally discarded the Gouled rule,
and Katz v. .United States3°° conclusively stripped search and seizure of
its longstanding dependence on ordinary property concepts.
A fundamental obstacle to the personal right to exclusion thesis is
then exposed. It would have been, and is, a truly innovative, theoretically sophisticated fourth amendment analysis, inviting breathtakingly
new ways of thinking about government, police, courts, and the Constitution. Its appearance in the Weeks line of cases examined here would
thus be more than unexpected-like an electronic scoreboard in the
Roman Coliseum, it would truly be an anachronism.
Stated as strongly as possible, given their theoretical simple-mindedness, Weeks and progeny could not have produced the evidentiary
transaction thesis. The cases here discussed confirm that they did not.
Those cases could not have produced any supporting rationale for a
personal right to exclusion, and examination reveals that they did not.
Furthermore, the pre-Olmstead cases did not clearly produce the exclusionary rule, much less an assertion (without rationale) of a constitutional right to it. Before Chief Justice Taft refashioned Weeks in Olinstead and attributed both exclusion and a fourth amendment basis for
it to Justice Day, suppression was just emerging in the cases as a refraction of the original Weeks return remedy. Put differently, one can
detect the exclusionary rule in some pre-Olmstead cases, but one cannot find, even on those infrequent occasions, anything more than the
Marbury duty fulfilled under difficult and changing conditions.
The earliest post-Weeks cases are just what one would expect.
Typically, Weeks was noted for its confirmation of judicial authority to
order return of evidence and for the declared duty to do so. United
0 1 was
States v. Hart"
decided within months of Weeks and appears to

299.
300.
301.

387 U.S. 294 (1967).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
216 F. 374 (N.D.N.Y.

1914). The Hart litigation produced two district
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have been the first exegetical effort. There the district court said that
Weeks affirmed a court's power to order return of documents unlawfully seized even if they were in the actual possession of the United
States Attorney.30 2 Similarly, the 1916 United States v. Jones case 0 3
remarked that tainted papers "must be returned" (citing Weeks) and
"that the court has power, and it is its duty, under such circumstances,
to direct and compel the United States Attorney to whom such papers
have been delivered to return same to the owner." 0 4 In neither case
were constitutional principles involved. Each saw Weeks as Weeks saw
itself: establishing jurisdiction to do the Marbury duty. 5 The common
current was stated most lucidly by the court in United States v.
Maresca:0
Whenever an officer of the court has in his possession or under
his control books or papers, or (by parity of reasoning) any other
articles in which the court has official interest, and of which any
person (whether party to a pending litigation or not) has been unlawfully deprived, that person may petition the court for restitution.
This I take to be an elementary principle, depending upon the inherent disciplinary power of any court of record.
Attorneys are officers of the court, and the United States attorney does not by taking office escape from this species of professional
discipline. Thus power to entertain this motion depends on the fact
that the party proceeded against is an attorney, not that he is an
official known as the United States attorney. It is further true that
the right to move does not at all depend on the existence307of this
indictment; it might be made, were no prosecution pending.
Maresca's vision did not falter when addressing the rule of decision
appropriate to the jurisdiction so established. Correctly detecting the
fifth amendment specter in Weeks, Maresca made clear that a pretrial
return proceeding was not a fifth amendment inquest. "The only
ground on which this or any similar motion can rest is that the prosecutor's possession of the book or paper is the result of" a fourth amend-

court opinions, each taking note of Weeks. The reference in this Article is to the Au-

gust 1914 opinion. For the June opinion, see 214 F. 655 (N.D.N.Y. 1914).
302. 216 F. at 376-77.
303. 230 F. 262 (N.D.N.Y. 1916).
304. Id. at 266.
305. That the Constitution was involved via the remedial command is evident
from other early cases that viewed continued impoundment by the court in the face of
a proper motion for return as unlawfully "continuing" the certifiable initial seizure.
See, e.g., Coastwise Lumber & Supply Co. v. United States, 259 F. 847, 853 (2d Cir.
1919); Perlman Rim Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 244 F. 304, 305 (S.D.N.Y.
1917).
306. 266 F. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1920).
307. Id.at 717.
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ment violation.3 08
The early cases are also a good measure of Weeks' theoretical underpinnings before Prohibition and Silverthorne's "use" terminology
that transformed its rule into one of suppression. The best illustrations
are the two cases that presaged Silverthorne's famous Holmesian
quotes and that, in fact, were the only two cases cited in support of the
relief granted there. The defendant in Flagg v. United States °9 applied
for return of papers within three days of their illegal seizure'3 10 They
were returned eighteen months later, after (in the court's words) the
government had "worked over them" and "obtained all the information
desired." ' Not good enough, said the Second Circuit. Returning them
then was "an idle ceremony."3 1 Retention of "'secondary evidence' "
after giving up the "'primary evidence'" simply would not do.3 13 On
similar facts, the same court in Linn v. United States314 determined
that the "wrong done in the seizure of the books was not cured by the
idle ceremony of returning them after the authorities . . . had obtained
their desired information."3 1 5 Flagg concurrer, Judge Veeder, saw two
things in the majority opinion quite clearly. One was that, like
Silverthorne, this super-return remedy sounded a lot like exclusion."'
Second, that whatever it was, it was a species of remedy. 1
The remedial quality of Weeks was implicitly recognized by many
cases3 1 8 and explicitly by some. Crisp articulation is found in an early
opinion by the Michigan Supreme Court.3 19 After a lengthy and sympathetic study of Boyd, Adams, and Weeks, the court harmonized
them as follows:
The principle underlying the decisions admitting the evidence is that
an objection to an offer of proof made on the trial of a cause raises
no other question than that of the competency, relevancy, and materiality of the evidence offered, and that consequently the court, on
such an objection, cannot enter on the trial of a collateral issue as to
308. Id. at 718. The court added (without explanation) "disregard" of due process to the grounds for return.
309. 233 F. 481 (2d Cir. 1916).
310. Id. at 483.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 486.
313. Id.
314. 251 F. 476 (2d Cir. 1918).
315. Id. at 480.
316. Id. at 486 (Veeder, J., concurring).
317. Id. at 486-87.
318. See, e.g., Nunes v. United States, 23 F.2d 905 (Ist Cir. 1928); Tucker v.
United States, 299 F. 235 (7th Cir. 1924); Wiggins v. United States, 272 F. 41 (2d
Cir. 1921); Youngblood v. United States, 266 F. 795 (8th Cir. 1920); Lyman v. United
States, 241 F. 945 (9th Cir. 1917) (cases insisting on observation of Weeks' strict procedural requirements).
319. People v. Marxhausen, 171 N.W. 557 (Mich. 1919).
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the soqrce from which the evidence was obtained. But, since there is
a right, there must of necessity be a remedy, and the remedy is to be
found in the making of a timely application to the court for an order
directing the return to the applicant of the papers unlawfully seized.
On such an application, the question of the illegality of the seizure
may be fully heard, and if the court erroneously refuses to order a
return of the papers, and thereafter receives them in evidence
against the applicant over his objection, 3it20 is an error for which a
judgment of conviction must be reversed.
The California Supreme Court in People v. Mayen. 21 similarly
read the federal authorities and affirmed the Weeks' insight that the
Marbury duty trumped police efficiency. Upon timely application,
"there should not be an arbitrary refusal to grant the demand in order
to hold the ill-gotten articles as evidence." 332 The court further stated:
The right of one whose goods have been unlawfully seized to
recover their possession, and that irrespective of its effect in depriving the state of their use in evidence, is not disputed; but the contention, which we think is maintained by the great weight of authority,
is that the proceeding for such recovery is independent of the criminal proceeding in which it is sought to use such articles as evidence.
Even conceding the right to demand such recovery by motion before
the court in which such criminal action is pending, as is apparently
the rule in the federal courts and as recognized in some of the state
decisions . . . upon what theory can it be held that such proceeding
is an incident of the trial, in such a sense that the ruling thereon
goes up on appeal as part of the record and subject to review by the
appellate court? It seems to us rather an independent proceeding to
enforce a civil right in no way involved in the criminal case. The
right of the defendant is not to exclude the incriminating documents
from evidence, but to recover the possession of articles which were
wrongfully taken from him. That right exists entirely apart from any
proposed use of the property by the state or its agents.323
Clarity of expression like this was uncommon, but the substance
expressed was not. Moreover, the remedial account of Weeks occupied
the whole field of fourth amendment rationales for exclusion prior to
Olmstead. That is, no alternative fourth amendment theory, like a personal right to exclusion, was developed. But that field was just a small
playground compared to the vast expanse covered by the fifth amendment. One group of cases was typified by United States v. Mandel,3 24 a
1927 Massachusetts District Court opinion that repeated the by-then
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323.
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Id. at 561.
205 P. 435 (Cal. 1922).
Id. at 441.
Id. (citations omitted).
17 F.2d 270 (D. Mass. 1927).
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familiar Gouled formula:
It is the Fourth Amendment which protects the individual
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and, whenever evidence
is obtained by encroaching upon these rights, to offer it in evidence
at the trial of the persons whose rights have been thus invaded is to
which comes
compel the defendant to give evidence against himself,
32 5
within the inhibitions of the Fifth Amendment.

In addition to these cases quite explicitly invoking self-incrimination

2

are those disguising some uncertainty by first stating the rule that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible, and second, string citing (more or
less) all the Supreme Court cases from Boyd to Amos, even including

Adams. Sometimes lower federal court cases were thrown in for good
measure, 27 but the constant presence of Gouled, and the occasional
absence of Weeks, prevent them from emerging as true exclusionary
rule cases. A third sizeable group was made up of group one refugees:
they
are fifth amendment cases, but you have to look carefully to see
3
it. 28

Wigmore, for one, did not see the fifth amendment in these cases,

or at least he so intensely disliked what he saw that he acted as if it
were not there. And an excursus on Wigmore's blind spot may well tell
us why others, including modern principled basis theorists, have ignored self-incrimination's role in exclusionary rule development. It appears from reading his batch of hypercritical articles on exclusion that
two things made him livid: letting the guilty go unpunished for any

reason and mishandling the fifth amendment-that is, broadening it
beyond testimonial compulsion. One can now predict Wigmore's outrage when the two occurred simultaneously, when criminals went free

as a result of distortions of self-incrimination. Wigmore's boiling point
325. Id. at 272.
326. See, e.g., Nunes v. United States, 23 F.2d 905 (1st Cir. 1928); Lee v.
United States, 14 F.2d 400, 406 (1st Cir. 1926) (Anderson, J., dissenting); Tucker v.
United States, 299 F. 235 (7th Cir. 1924); Murby v. United States, 293 F. 849 (lst
Cir. 1923); Synder v. United States, 285 F. 1 (4th Cir. 1922); United States v. Mattingly, 285 F. 922 (D.C. Cir. 1922); Honeycutt v. United States, 277 F. 939 (4th Cir.
1921); Rice v. United States, 251 F. 778 (1st Cir. 1918); United States v.. Burns, 4
F.2d 131 (S.D. Fla. 1925); United States v. Myers, 287 F. 260 (W.D. Ky. 1923);
United States v. Harnich, 289 F. 256 (D. Conn. 1922); In re Tri-State Coal & Coke
Co., 253 F. 605 (W.D. Pa. 1918).
327. See, e.g., Park v. United States, 294 F. 776 (1st Cir. 1924) (no cite to
Weeks); Voorhies v. United States, 299 F. 275 (5th Cir. 1924); Giles v. United States,
284 F. 208 (1st Cir. 1922); United States v. Codde, 22 F.2d 620 (E.D. Mich. 1927);
United States v. O'Dowd, 273 F. 600 (N.D. Ohio 1921); United States v. Bush, 269 F.
455 (W.D.N.Y. 1920).
328. See, e.g., Watson v. United States, 6 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1925); United
States v. Jajeswiec, 285 F. 789 (D. Mass. 1923); United States v. Maresca, 266 F. 713
(S.D.N.Y. 1920); United States v. Abrams, 230 F. 313 (D. Vt. 1916).
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is apparent from the uncharitable tenor of his articles, but a close look
at those pieces shows more than a scholar losing his cool. His defense
mechanism turns out to be of the "see no evil" variety. Cases condoning lawbreaking via unsound fifth amendment analysis were not fifth
amendment cases. Gouled is one such example. From Wigmore's discussion of that case one would never know that the fifth amendment
was even mentioned there. 82 9 There are other case analyses in which he
committed, or intended, the same mistake,8 30 but a series of Georgia
Supreme Court decisions especially hammered by Wigmore are most
illustrative. The starting point is the 1897 decision in Williams v.
State,3 ' applauded by Wigmore for its adherence to the "ancient rule"
33 2
admitting illegally and, in that case, reprehensibly acquired evidence.
Of Hammock v. State, 3 ' a gun possession case decided a decade later,
Wigmore said: "[T]his is a flat repudiation of Williams v. State...
although the opinion endeavors to distinguish it . . .on the ground .that
there was a compulsory self-incrimination, but this is unsound.""3 Furthermore and most importantly,
the opinion frankly avows "a public policy which would rather see
the guilty go unpunished than have the guilt of the accused established" in this manner. Powell, J., the writer of the opinion, is one of
our most accomplished living judges; but in a country so cursed by
the use of concealed weapons the "public policy" thus declared is the
worst kind of a policy; and it is undoubtedly doing just what it confesses to, viz. letting the guilty go unpunished."
In actuality Hammock said:
In Williams v. State the objection was not made to the tesetimony
[sic] on the ground that the defendant had been compelled to furnish testimony tending to incriminate herself, but merely on the
ground that the search and seizure, by which the testimony was disclosed, was unlawful, and the decision of the court was upon this
point alone.336

329. See Wigmore, supra note 11, at 484 n.1.
330. For example, see Wigmore's analysis of the following cases: Hughes v.
State, 58 S.E. 390 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907); Calhoun v. State, 87 S.E. 893 (Ga. 1916);
Tucker v. State, 90 So. 845 (Miss. 1922); State v. Gibbons, 203 P. 390 (Wash. 1922).
Wigmore, supra note II, at 480 n.l.
331. 28 S.E. 624 (Ga. 1897).
332. Wigmore, supra note 11, at 480 n.1 Williams is also remarkable for an
exceedingly thoughtful opinion by Chief Justice Lumpkin, who most emphatically affirmed the fourth amendment duties of courts, but who did not think exclusion an appropriate judicial response to police misconduct. 28 S.E. at 627-28.
333. 58 S.E. 66 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907).
334. Wigmore, supra note II, at 480 n. I.

335. Id.
336. 58 S.E. at 67.
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[W]e hold that, when a person is subjected to an illegal arrest accompanied by an unlawful search of his person, whereby he is involuntarily compelled to disclose evidence of a crime which,. in the absence of his volition being destroyed, he would not otherwise have
disclosed, the evidence so obtained7 shall not be received against him
on a prosecution for the crime. 3
The "policy" bitterly denounced by Wigmore was that mandated by
the state constitution: the law would rather let the guilty go unpunished
than establish guilt "by violently and unlawfully compelling him to furnish evidence against himself."3 38
Hammock preserved the ancient rule of Williams, eschewed exclusion, and like most courts of its time, saw the fifth amendment as the
Supreme Court did in Gouled, but at the same time in a way that we
do not. Wigmore's "definition" of the exclusionary rule is now out in
the open: whenever the analytical starting point is illegal search and
seizure and the ending is failure to receive the evidence, you have exclusion. In a layman's sense that is good enough, but Wigmore was not
a layman. In between those two poles may be a variety of doctrinal
paths, including the fifth amendment, as in Hammock and Gouled, the
remedial duty undertaken in Weeks, which tolerated loss of evidence as
the cost of Marbury, maybe even a fourth amendment personal right to
exclusion. Wigmore's undifferentiated trashing of all these "crime coddling" techniques may be the stuff of a good editorial, but it certainly
impoverishes legal analysis. Regrettably, the redneck rhetoric seems to
be our chief inheritance from the rule's "Great Critic," and it has
much obscured the original bases of exclusion.
One thing Wigmore did not obscure, but which principled basis
theorists do, is the theoretical quality of the Weeks rule. Wigmore
judged return and subsequent unavailability at trial exceedingly misguided, but at least he understood it as misguided remedial doctrine.
But again, Wigmore failed to illumine this normative framework because he thought the application of it unsound. He dispatched Weeks'
preservation of Adams by seizing hold of the collateral/material distinction in the ancient rule: once trial begins, the means of acquisition
do not affect admissibility. 3 9 Weeks' insistence on a pretrial motion for
return, based upon remedial principles, did not undermine Adams because no collateral issue could then be tendered at trial. "But surely
this is an unsound use of the term collateral," 84 0 Wigmore fulminated.
"[A] defendant cannot turn a collateral fact into a material fact by
merely making a formal motion before trial . ... I'l The categorical
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id.
Id.
Wigmore, supra note 3, at 43.
Id.
Id.
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error is plain. No one, other than Wigmore, is talking about a trial
issue, main or otherwise. The remedial course is run on an independent
track, and while its outcome may affect the trial, no "trial issue" is
thereby generated. No suggestion that the means of acquisition affected
competence was made. And here, too, Wigmore helps to confuse rather
than to illumine the exclusionary rule story, for he neglects, or at least
neuters, that vast number of pre-Olmstead cases which took Weeks'
distinction of Adams seriously. Adams and Weeks are regularly cited
in harmony. As late as 1951, one federal court cited Adams as good
law.8 42 The largest single group of Weeks cases before 1928 consisted
of opinions insisting that a timely pretrial motion for return be made to
invoke Weeks' protection. 4 Conversely, these same opinions routinely
remarked that illegally seized evidence was admissible, unless the defendant had previously moved for return. Courts frequently received
tainted evidence in the absence of that motion, rather happily relying
on Adams. " '
Others did not. Professor Grant is no doubt correct in noting that
judicial disapproval of the Volstead Act induced modification of the
procedural requisites of Weeks. 4 3 It is just as surely true that in many
cases, the fifth amendment trial objection subsumed Weeks, and its
firm constitutional footing could overcome the "merely procedural"
Adams rule. In addition, what appears to be a simple equitable sense
softened Weeks. When the defendant did not know until trial of the
search and seizure, the motion was dispensable. 4 6 When the facts adduced at trial were undisputed and sufficient to determine illegality, no
"collateral issue" was raised. 47 In a state case striving to follow Weeks
and sounding very much like a true exclusionary rule case, trial was
soon enough to object because the Weeks pretrial proceeding was unauthorized by state law.34 8 At the same time, Prohibition itself, and not
just judicial hostility to it, further modified Weeks until it looked just
342. United States v. Edmonds, 100 F. Supp. 862 (D.C.D.C. 1951).
343. See, e.g., Nunes v. United States, 23 F.2d 905 (1st Cir. 1928); Tucker v.
United States, 299 F. 235 (7th Cir. 1924); Winkle v. United States, 291 F. 493 (8th
Cir. 1923); Wiggins v. United States, 272 F. 41 (2d Cir. 1921); Haywood v. United
States, 268 F. 795 (7th Cir. 1920); Youngblood v. United States, 266 F. 795 (8th Cir.
1920); Laughter v. United States, 259 F. 94 (6th Cir. 1919); Rice v. United States,
251 F. 778 (1st Cir. 1918); Lyman v. United States, 241 F. 945 (9th Cir. 1917); In re
Tri-State Coal & Coke Co., 253 F. 605 (W.D. Pa. 1918); United States v. Friedberg,
233 F. 313 (E.D. Pa. 1916); United States v. Abrams, 230 F. 313 (D. Vt. 1916);
United States v. Lombardo, 228 F. 980 (W.D. Wash. 1915).
344. See, e.g., Winkle v. United States, 291 F. 493 (8th Cir. 1923); Farmer v.
United States, 223 F. 903 (2d Cir. 1915).
345. Grant, supra note 174, at 364-65.
346. Harkline v. United States, 4 F.2d 526 (8th Cir. 1925); Landwirth v. United
States, 299 F. 281 (3d Cir. 1924).

347.

Salata v. United States, 286 F. 125 (6th Cir. 1923).

348.

Youman v. Commonwealth, 224 S.W. 860 (Ky. Ct. App. 1920).
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like "suppression." Since contraband liquor was increasingly the subject of illegal seizure, return was increasingly implausible. Through
casuistic reasoning, a few judges convinced themselves that illicit booze
was returnable,8 9 but most faced the dilemma squarely and devised a
Solomonic solution. The liquor was not returned and the government
could not use it at trial.350 Sometimes fifth amendment analysis produced this compromise, but more often it was undistilled Weeks remedial reasoning. In a short time, the relevant motion (which was still
ordinarily pretrial) was for "suppression."
These various developments contributed to a single salient result-the Weeks earmarks of remedy disappeared. The theoretical flags
denoting independent remedial proceeding, the obvious equity of simple
replevin, and the bright Adams line between Weeks and the trial itself
were lowered. And Wigmore, while not a reliable reporter of events,
turned out to be gifted prophet. For practical purposes, Weeks now
presented a trial issue, and the issue was exclusion. The way was thus
prepared for Chief Justice Taft to proclaim that Weeks' account of the
fourth amendment included exclusion of illegally seized evidence.
The historical details of the path from return to suppression are
not as important as their analytical significance. The question here is
not the exclusionary rule's true date of birth, but the normative climate
in which it was born. What has perhaps been implicit in the developmental account should be made crystal clear: there is nothing of either
the evidentiary transaction or the "personal right to exclusion" in it. A
few cases, like Olmstead, sound as if they are finding exclusion "in"
the fourth amendment, but they do not contemplate a right to an untainted trial and say nothing in support of their "constitutional" interpretation, save for Weeks. The cases do say a number of discreet things
that contradict such exaggerations. First, there is the common judicial
insistence that a Weeks motion for return, suppression, or both be filed
and litigated before trial.35 1 While sometimes honored in the breach, no
court appears to have denied it as the preferred practice. This procedural requirement signals the remedial rationale, for it was still a general principle that trial objections could neither be made nor litigated
before the jury was sworn. The Adams wedge between exclusion and
trial, and therefore the wedge between suppression and a personal con349. See, e.g., Geraghty v. Potter, 5 F.2d 366 (D. Mass. 1925); United States v.
Kelih, 272 F. 484 (S.D. Ill. 1921); Connelly v. United States, 275 F. 509 (N.D.N.Y.
1921).
350. See, e.g., United States v. Kaplan, 286 F. 963 (S.D. Ga. 1923); United
States v. O'Dowd, 273 F. 600 (N.D. Ohio 1921); United States v. Rykowski, 267 F.
866 (S.D. Ohio 1920).
351. This longstanding practice was later incorporated into FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(E). See In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 458 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 332 U.S. 807
(1947).
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stitutional right to it, is preserved. A second contradiction is standing.
Articulated at the same time that exclusion was, 3 2 it means that suppression is some kind of response to antecedent police misconduct and
not itself a trial creature. Otherwise, exclusion would be available to
whomever was on trial and not just to those aggrieved by the constable.
While standing was an issue in only a few cases, no opinion questioned
the doctrine, and no defendant excluded evidence illegally obtained
from someone else. A third and less direct contradiction is the near
celebration of the "silver platter doctrine." With the approval of the

Supreme Court, inferior courts without remorse received evidence unlawfully seized by state police officers (as in Weeks) 35 and by private

individuals. 5' 4 Obliquely suggested by the doctrine's good health is the
presence of a much less powerful theoretical charge than principled ba-

sis theorists may safely acknowledge. A final contradiction resides in
the next section of this Article. As post-Olmstead "suppression" courts

cast about for a reason underlying a rule whose originating impulse was
now obscured, they said an assortment of things, none of them supportive of the proffered principled bases. In this they imitated Justices of

the Supreme Court, and a brief review of the much larger sample of
lower court cases provides valuable confirmation of the hypotheses already developed.
C.

The Search for Weeks, III: Inferior Courts 1929-1949

Do not be misled by the separation into pre- and post-Olmstead
cases, for there is little new here. The overriding characteristic of these
later decisions is continuity. They look a lot like their predecessors as
well as their contemporaries in the United States Reports. The single,
detectable shift was glacial and affected the fifth amendment's predom-

inance as the locus of exclusion. After 1928, it remained an important
justificatory device, the single most cited rationale for exclusion,'" con352. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
353. See, e.g.. Robinson v. United States, 292 F. 683 (9th Cir. 1923); Rowan v.
United States, 281 F. 137 (5th Cir. 1922).
354. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
355. See, e.g., Felman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487, 490 (1944); United States
v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927);
McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927); Lotto v. United States, 157 F.2d
623, 625 (8th Cir. 1946); United States v. Lindenfeld, 142 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir.
1944); Takahashi v. United States, 143 F.2d 118, 122 (9th Cir. 1944); Bozel v. Hudspeth, 126 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1942); Price v. Johnston, 125 F.2d 805, 812 (9th
Cir. 1942); Valli v. United States, 94 F.2d 687, 691 (1st Cir. 1938); Brown v. United
States, 83 F.2d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1936); Safarik v. United States, 62 F.2d 892, 898
(8th Cir. 1933); Donahue v. United States, 56 F.2d 94, 99 (9th Cir. 1932); Kroska v.
United States, 51 F.2d 330, 332 (8th Cir. 1931); United States v. Gowen, 40 F.2d 593,
597 (2d Cir. 1930); Day v. United States, 37 F.2d 80, 81 (8th Cir. 1929); In re
Meader, 60 F. Supp. 80, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1945); United States v. Richmond, 57 F. Supp.
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sidering each of the fourth amendment reasons-deterrence, judicial
integrity, sanction-separately. Taken as a whole, however, the search
and seizure guarantee itself was more frequently the ultimate source of

exclusion. The bulk of these cases were in still a different category in
which no rationale at all was offered. Judges routinely pronounced that
"illegally obtained evidence must be suppressed" without any citation, 356 and just as frequently, the sole precedent was Weeks. " In
other words, to the judicial mind, by 1949, exclusion had become both
self-evident and virtually self-justifying. Put differently still, that slothful manana mentality prevailed. Before Olmstead, the fifth amendment
was a disincentive to theoretical progress; after it, the familiarity

among suppression, Weeks, and the fourth amendment heralded by
Taft wrought a similar judicial lassitude. Yes, there are cases that
make deterrence noises, some rather audibly."

There are disparate

holdings sounding like the "give effect" Taft opinion

"

or vaguely akin

rationale, 360

to the judicial integrity
but they are dwarfed by those that
take the rule for granted. Typical of the justificatory malaise (though

not of judges suffering from it) is Learned Hand's 1945 opinion in
United States v. Pugliese,3 61 a case that among other things, confirmed

the silver platter doctrine:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is
the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In
903, 907 (S.D. W. Va. 1944); In re Andrews' Tax Liability, 18 F. Supp. 804, 807 (D.
Md. 1937), United States v. Maggio, 51 F.2d 397, 399 (W.D.N.Y. 1931); Camden
County Beverage Co. v. Blair, 46 F.2d 648, 650 (D.N.J. 1930); United States v. A
Certain Distillery, 24 F.2d 557, 558 (E.D. La. 1928); United States v. Napela, 28 F.2d
898, 903 (N.D.N.Y. 1928).
356. See, e.g., Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557, 561 (6th Cir, 1948);
In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 466 (2d Cir. 1947); Fraternal Order of Eagles No. 778 v.
United States, 57 F.2d 93, 94 (3d Cir. 1932); Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390,
394 (3d Cir. 1932); United States v. Novero, 58 F. Supp. 275, 278 (E.D. Mo. 1944);
United States v. Fifty-Eight Drums of Material Designed for Mfr. of Intoxicating Liquor, 38 F.2d 1005, 1005 (W.D. Pa. 1930); United States v. Leach, 24 F.2d 965, 966
(D. Del. 1928).
357. See, e.g., United States v. Krulewitch, 167 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir. 1948);
Elwood v. Smith, 164 F.2d 449, 451 (9th Cir. 1947); In re Ginsburg, 147 F.2d 749,
750 (2d Cir. 1945); Harris v. United States, 151 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1945); Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 32 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1929);
House v. Mayo, 85 F. Supp. 365, 368 (S.D. Fla. 1949); United States v. A Certain
Distillery, 24 F.2d 557, 558 (E.D. La. 1928).
358. See, e.g.. In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 466 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting in part); Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1940); In
re Dooley, 48 F.2d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 1931).
359. See e.g., Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139, 145 (6th Cir. 1944); Fraternal Order of Eagles No. 778 v. United States, 57 F.2d 93, 94 (3d Cir. 1932).
360. See, e.g., Day v. United States, 37 F.2d 80, 81 (8th Cir. 1929).
361. 153 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1945).
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earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may
have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case

the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that
it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be repressed. If so,
when the offenders are not responsible to the prosecution, they have
too remote an interest in its success, if they have any at all, to make
exclusion a remedy. Be the explanation what it may, the distinction
862
is too well established to be questioned in the lower courts.
Here are practically all the available rationales in a single paragraph,
coupled with the resignation appropriate to what, by then, was an ensconced tradition no longer in need of careful justificatory attention.
A few important events confirm the nondevelopment of anything
like a personal right to exclusion. One is the persistence of standing
limitations in a pure fourth amendment regime. 33 That is, once exclusion was clearly traced to the fourth, and not the fifth, amendment, the
persistence of standing shows that only a response to antecedent police
misconduct was involved and not a right to be free of entire "evidentiary transactions." The continued good health of both the silver platter
doctrine 64 and the seasonable assertion requirement3 65 reveal the presence of the originating Weeks remedial impulse, even when exclusion
was not viewed (and Hand is not to the contrary) as a Hohfeldian remedy. The new doctrine that the defendant's statements of ownership in
aid of his suppression motion may be used at trial 36 also witnesses a
sub- or nonconstitutional understanding of exclusion. It suggests that
exclusion is not seen as a true equal of the search and seizure guarantee itself.
Prohibition and its proliferation of federal law enforcement personnel induced two remaining, rare instances of judicial reflection on
the origins of exclusion. Could a Weeks-inspired court order the return
of evidence in custody not of federal marshals, then viewed as court
adjuncts, but in the control of Prohibition agents3 6 7 or the Federal Bureau of Investigation?3 68 Yes, answered the Supreme Court in Go-Bart

362. Id. at 499.
363. See, e.g., Whitcombe v. United States, 90 F.2d 290, 293 (3d Cir. 1937),
and cases cited therein.
364. See, e.g., United States v. Liss, 105 F.2d 144, 145 (2d Cir. 1939); Ex parte
Vilarino, 50 F.2d 582, 585 (9th Cir. 1931); In re Guzzardi, 84 F. Supp. 294, 295 (N.D.
Tex 1949).
365. See, e.g., Takahashi v. United States, 143 F.2d 118, 122 (9th Cir. 1944);
Durkin v. United States, 62 F.2d 305, 307 (1st Cir. 1932); United States v. Alabama
Highway Express, 46 F. Supp. 450, 452 (N.D. Ala. 1942); United States v. Napela, 28
F.2d 898, 903 (N.D.N.Y. 1928).
366. Heller v. United States, 57 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1932).
367. See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
368. See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870 (W.D.N.Y.
1943).
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Importing Co. v. United States.3 69 Agents are "subject to the proper
exertion of the disciplinary powers of the court. And on the facts here
shown it is plain that the district court had jurisdiction summarily to
determine whether the evidence should be suppressed and the papers
returned to the petitioners. 3 70 The Court in United States v. Antonelli
Fireworks Co. 3 71 found FBI agents similarly within the courts' "powers." 3 7 2 Each holding locates the authority to suppress not in the Constitution itself, but where Weeks found it-in the inherent remedial
powers of the judge.
V.

CONCLUSION

Casting Wolf as a heretic makes about as much sense as portraying Judas as Jesus' most faithful disciple. Wolf said literally nothing
that had not been said better before. One cannot even say it consummated a developmental or formative process. Since Wolf capped an era
of nondevelopment, a necessary premise is lacking. "Consummation" is
inapposite in any event, for it implies some surpassing-if only a better
organization of existing materials. Wolf is, instead, the epitome of stagnation. Its proper relationship to previously articulated doctrine is like
that of a summer rerun to a premiere. Among the many scenes
replayed by Frankfurter's opinion for the Court are the following:
First, "[in] Weeks . . . this Court held that in a federal prosecution
the Fourth Amendment barred the use of evidence secured through an
illegal search and seizure . . . . Since then it has been frequently applied and we stoutly adhere to it."1378 Second, we must hesitate to treat
this remedy as an essential ingredient of the [Fourth Amendment]
right.37 4 Frankfurter went on to add that
the ways of enforcing such a basic right raise questions of a different
order. How. such arbitrary conduct should be checked, what remedies against it should be afforded, the means by which the right
should be made effective, are all questions that are not to be so dogmatically answered as to preclude the varying solutions which spring
of judgment on issues not susceptible of
from an allowable range
375
quantitative solution.
Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be
an effective way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for this
Court 'to condemn as falling below the minimal standards assured by
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

282 U.S. 344 (1931).
Id. at 355 (citing Weeks, Wise, Mills, and McHie).
53 F. Supp. 870 (W.D.N.Y. 1943).
Id. at 873.
338 U.S. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.
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the Due Process Clause a State's reliance upon other methods,
which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective. 76
The remaining Wolf opinions were less original. Justice Douglas
added that but for "that rule of evidence of evidence [exclusion] the
Amendment would have no effective sanction. ' 77 Justice Murphy lucidly muddied the waters with this rhetorical query: "[W]hat an illusory remedy this is, if by 'remedy' we mean a positive deterrent to police and prosecutors tempted to violate the Fourth Amendment." 78 He
then showed up the illusion by demonstrating how the Hohfeldian
plaintiff was inadequately afforded the Marbury quantum of relief.3 7 9
Justice Black observed that exclusion was "a judicially created rule of
evidence which Congress might negate, 38
I but a flabbergasted Justice
Rutledge "reject[ed] any intimation that Congress possessed such authority," an issue he thought settled by Boyd and confirmed by (of all
cases) Adams.881 Rutledge further noted that "[t]he view that the
Fourth Amendment itself forbids the introduction of evidence illegally
obtained in federal prosecutions is one of long standing and firmly established. 882 The irrepressible Rutledge hedged his bet upon this "personal right to exclusion" by siding with Murphy that "the Amendment
without the sanction is a dead letter."383 And the caution was well
founded, for all he mustered in support of his regal pronouncement was
Olmstead, 84 specifically Taft's reinvention of Weeks. That Rutledge
never escapes the fifth amendment's influence in his two page opinion
ultimately neuters his "personal rights" threat.
On the only important point, every member of the Wolf Court
(with a caveat for the puzzled Rutledge) got it right and was consistent
with every prior opinion: suppression was not part of the fourth amendment. A fortiori, the unitary model had yet to be constructed, and the
evidentiary transaction was still unconsummated.
That is about all the insight Wolf mustered. Largely parroting the
melange of rationales previously uttered, Wolf is firmly within the tradition of undifferentiated use of terms like "remedy" and "sanction"
and judicial failure to scrutinize critically their true justificatory capacity. The result-there is no "original understanding." Once the remedial quality of Weeks was lost in the transition from return to exclusion
(and Frankfurter opined that suppression did not fit the Marbury
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

31.
40 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
42-43 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
43-44.
40 (Black, J.,
concurring).
48 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
47.
48.
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model),3 85 there is no rationale possessing temporal priority. Put most
explicitly, the Wolf Court could not swallow exclusion as a Hohfeldian
remedy. The rule it ingested was therefore not theoretically traceable
to Weeks. And Wolf, which involved unlawful seizure of documentary
evidence, exemplifies the eclipse of the fifth amendment basis for the
exclusionary rule. The remaining rationales are then reduced to the status of mere contenders for the title, and they all strutted their stuff in
Wolf. Thus, if you like, there are a host of "original" (though largely
unexplored) understandings, for Wolf is more the "original" case than
Weeks, since the incorporation it wrought obliged the Court to confront
directly exclusion's constitutional status. Wolfs unsatisfying pluralistic
account simply means that, for us, there is no avoiding a square confrontation with both the inherent soundness and the constitutional authority of the exclusionary rule.
The search for a "principled basis" will probably 'continue, though
it takes some figuring to determine why. A plausible constitutional basis for exclusion-deterrence, in its various guises-is hardly without
principle, though it does depend upon contemporary reality for life.3 8
And its evident unattractiveness to Professor Kamisar and Justice
Brennan, for instance, propels the ironies of exclusionary rule discourse
back to the surface. These proponents of a "living Constitution" -one
whose cardinal interpretive norm is currency with modernity--:are unexpectedly possessed by a desire to govern one of our day's thorniest
social problems with a 1914 opinion, and it is fair to say that especially
in criminal procedure, where case lives are measured by the term, no
case older than Weeks is considered authoritative by such modernizers.
Only a little less surprising is the spectacle of judicial "conservatives,"
who would gladly seek conclusive authority in eighteenth-century analogues, blithely ignoring, but not denying, an' apparently potent
originalist argument of more recent vintage.
The ironies may of course be plunged back into the depths by
looking beyond intellectual and jurisprudential integrity. When judges
and commentators perform such somersaults, it is usually because they
smell the scent of a preferred result. The exclusionary rule has become
a litmus test, not of constitutional law or theory so much as the moral
worth of the entire social system. Viewed on one side as the symbol of
our commitment to fair treatment of the accused, exclusion on the
other side is seen as a morally indefensible inversion of the law's priori-

385.
386.
"remedy"
gressional

Id. at 28 (Frankfurter, J., writing for the majority).
Whether the federal judiciary possesses "inherent" power to fashion a
on this basis without congressional authorization, or in the teeth of a conprohibition, is uncertain. For an enlightening discussion of these issues, see

Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining PrudentialPowers of the President
and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping
Clause, 36 OHIo ST. L.J. 788 (1975).
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ties and purposes. In either event, the debilitating effect upon the integrity of constitutional law is the same. Precisely this kind of result-oriented jurisprudence has virtually bankrupted constitutional criminal
procedure by robbing it of any semblance of objective, neutral content.
Justice Stevens' charge that a majority of the Court has abandoned
doctrinal discipline to become a prosecutorial cheering section is only
one symptom of the disease.$8 7 That he who casts the first stone need
not be without sin is apparent from Stevens' bitter dissent in Moran v.
Burbine, 88 in which with Wigmorish vigor, he blasted the majority's
careful (and basically correct) distinction of constitutional doctrine
(Miranda) from objectionable police behavior (deception of an unretained attorney). Instead, Stevens would begin constitutional reflection with his moral calculator and then fashion doctrine suited to the
problem.38 9 That Justices Marshall and Brennan trail doctrine in the
wake of personal moral philosophy has long been apparent, not only
from their support of Stevens in Moran, but also from their continued
dissent in capital punishment cases fully a decade after their philosophy was decisively scotched by the law.390 The final irony is that the
search for a "principled basis" typified herein is also typical of that
bankruptcy and its cause. These commentators pass off strident posturing and unconvincing polemics as constitutional interpretation and do
so in pursuit solely of something, anything, to save the exclusionary
rule from Wigmore's descendants.

387. See, e.g., New Jersey v. TLO, 104 S. Ct. 3583, 3584 (Stevens, J., dissenting
from order to reargue).
388. 54 U.S.L.W. 4265, 4270-71 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1986) (No. 84-1485) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
389.

Id. at 4270.

390. See, e.g., Moore v. Texas, 54 U.S.L.W. 3558 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1986). (No.
85-6372).

